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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the economic and policy context for environmental
investments in the  countries of  Central and Eastern Europe  that are
candidates  for  membership in the  European Union. This context is
created by macroeconomic constraints, the unfinished process of
transition and the requirements of membership. The task is to identify
these constraints and point to policy options for decision-makers on both
sides of the enlargement process.
1.1 The looming negotiating impasse
Benefiting from its experience in previous enlargements, the Commission
will not be satisfied with the legal transposition of the environmental
acquis (the existing regulations) into national laws by the new candidates
for accession. Rather, it has established a triple test of acquis compliance,
giving equal importance to 1) legal transposition, 2) administrative
enforcement capacity and 3) physical investments needed to comply with
the directives.
Progress has been unsatisfactory on all three levels. As regards legal
transposition, the simple option of adopting (translating) the body of EU
regulation without changing a comma has not been chosen by most of the
candidate countries, although a look across the western border would
have shown that any specific national needs could have been
accommodated, not in the language of the laws, but in the timing and
method of implementing directives.
The candidate countries themselves see the second acquis test – building
the administrative capacity to enforce the environmental  acquis on the
ground – as increasingly problematical. The explanation is part budgetary
– state salaries no longer attract qualified personnel – and part political.
First, responsibility for environmental matters in the Central and Eastern
European countries (CEECs) is widely distributed among half a dozen
ministries,
1 of which the environment ministry is usually the weakest.
Coalition governments make the re-assignment of responsibilities
especially difficult.
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Secondly, effective environmental  inspectorates and the issuance of
permits require the empowerment, including funding, of regional and
local levels of administration. Decentralisation is an ongoing process in
most candidate countries that extends well beyond environmental matters.
Nevertheless, decision-making remains difficult while the bigger picture
is being defined.
This study deals primarily with the third  acquis test: investment in
physical plant needed to comply with the acquis. Here, progress was
always expected to be slow, since there is both a shortage of money and
inherent technical delays in planning and executing works. However, the
tight-budget explanation for the slow pace
2 of environmental investments
could not explain why there is still only a trickle in the “project pipeline”.
It would seem that some of the problems with this third test of conformity
are not unrelated to those of the second: unclear administrative lines of
responsibility. In the case of investments, however, the municipal level is
particularly important, notably as regards water,  wastewater and waste
management.
It would also appear that this immobility is not entirely unwelcome to the
governments. They have been told that the major part of the needed
investment must come from local, not European, sources. Thus, any
project delayed is an expenditure avoided. There are, of course, EU
grants available, but much of Union “assistance” takes the form of loans
from the international financial institutions (IFIs). While such loans are
granted at relatively advantageous rates, especially by the  European
Investment bank (EIB), which offers grace periods of up to five years,
they are generally not soft loans and almost always require sovereign
guarantees.
3
Such guarantees are considered on the same footing as direct government
debt. The ability of CEEC governments to  assume debt themselves is
limited both by the EU’s macroeconomic accession (“Maastricht”
4)
criteria and by precise ceilings negotiated with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). In other words, environmental projects not only compete in
current budgetary terms with other social needs – education, health and
                                                                
2 European Commission (2001, pp. 4-5).
3 The EBRD has begun to arrange non-recourse  (non-sovereign guarantee)
environmental project finance in the CEECs.
4 Although two existing member states have negotiated “opt-outs” as regards the
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defence  – but also in terms of a finite annual limit o n debt-financed
public investment.
In this competition, candidate governments generally give higher priority
to investment in transport infrastructure, notably roads. These are
politically popular and yield short-term economic gains. Socio-economic
returns as high as 200% on some projects have been calculated by the
World Bank.  Motorway projects are also larger than environmental ones,
and technically  often more straightforward. On both counts they are
easier to administer in an international context.
In 2000, the Commission launched an initiative called PEPA (Priority
Environmental Projects for Accession) to look into the reasons for the
low rate of project proposals and to help both the candidates and the
Commission to get a detailed and accurate view of their own  acquis-
related project preparation. The significance of this programme goes
beyond technical assistance: it i s also a step towards the end-game of
entry negotiations, when decisions on transition periods have to be taken.
Experts originally estimated the investment cost for  the  CEECs  to
achieve compliance with  the environmental  acquis at around 3-4% of
GDP over 20  years. The Commission now assumes they need to spend
between 2 and 3% of GDP “in the coming years”.
5 But, as will be
explained below, these are largely crude investment costs and do not
include operational and financial follow-on costs which may be borne by
the public budget. Common accepted prudential limits on public spending
for the CEEC economies suggest a maximum  expenditure  on
environment – investment, financial charges and operational costs added
together  – of around 2.5% of GDP per annum. This  translates into a
mathematical necessity for transition periods expressed in decades rather
than years.
1.2 A path towards economically sustainable acquis investment
This study argues that there are policy options available to substantially
reduce the gap between the desirable and the possible. The present
impasse results in part from a planning and forecast exercise which, like
the discredited socialist planning of the past, is based on multiplying
quantities, taken as given, with equipment and operating costs, taken as
given.
This study seeks to demonstrate that:
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-  The main constraint is budgetary rather than macroeconomic. The
full scope for off-budget investments therefore needs to be exploited.
-  There is a large scope for policies directed at improving efficiency:
achieving the greatest environmental benefit from a given amount of
resources.
Major efficiency reserves lie in the following areas:
-  using the (near-) full cost recovery principle to reduce demand for
power, water and waste;
-  optimising management efficiencies through  shifting economic
responsibilities to public or private agents;
-  creating a context in which municipalities take efficient investment
decisions; and
-  making use of provisions in the directives that allow derogations for
investments with high marginal costs.
In order to promote an environmental  efficiency-oriented agenda, the
candidate countries should:
-  privatise polluting industries still in public ownership;
-  fully commit to effective inspectorates; and
-  re-organise the utility sector, especially water, to form
geographically optimal and economically strong entities.
The Commission should:
-  review its legalistic stance on standards to take account of marginal
cost/benefit ratios;
-  enlarge the concept of  “administrative capacity” to include
management structures;
-  refrain from using the ISPA 75% ceiling on grant finance in  favour
of a 10-20% contribution to any single project; and
-  integrate broader policy options into investment planning.5
CHAPTER 2
THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE
This  chapter  provides an overview of the scope of investment
requirements that Central and East European countries are facing in the
area of the environment.
2.1 Acquis-related investment
Major investments are related to relatively few directives, with the most
costly ones related to water and power. They include:
-  Large Combustion Plant Directive (1988)
-  Urban Wastewater Directive (1991) Water Framework
- Drinking Water Directive (1980) Directive (2001)
-  Air Quality Framework Directive (1996) and its daughter directives
-  Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive (1996)
-  Hazardous Waste Incineration Directive (1994)
-  Municipal Waste Incineration Directives (1989)
-  Landfill Directive (1999)
-  Several directives related to solid waste management and recycling
schemes.
Physical investment will also be required, under the heading
“administrative capacity” for monitoring stations, laboratory equipment,
etc. The details of these investments are summarised in Table 1.
2.2  The €100 million question
In the past, accession to the European Union required mainly the
adoption of existing regulations in all areas of the Union’s competence,
including the environment. In earlier rounds of enlargement, involving
i.a. Greece, Spain and Portugal, the Union had been content to consider
the transposition into national laws of this acquis as sufficient for entry.
As regards the environment, however, regulations could not effectively
be implemented as long as old polluting capital stock (notably
manufacturing and utilities) had not been replaced or upgraded and new
end-of-pipe investment made.  It was found that after a seemingly
successful completion of entry negotiations, the legal acquis merely set
up a strong claim by the new members for massive transfers (notably
through the Cohesion Fund) to enable them to abide by the laws.6
Table 1. The structure of acquis -related investment
Sector/Directive
Air quality
Likely investor Heavy investment Other investment
Fuel Quality Directives (see also IPPC Directive, below) Oil refineries Process changes Testing systems
Water quality
Drinking Water Directive Municipalities, water
utilities/companies
Water collection/abstraction
Water treatment plants
Water delivery/supply systems
Surface water monitoring
DW quality monitoring (at treatment plant &
at tap)
Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive Wastewater collection systems
Wastewater treatment plants
Effluent monitoring
Sewage Sludge Directive
Municipalities, water
utilities/companies
Sludge de-watering systems
Sewage sludge incinerators
Composting/treatment plants
Sludge transport systems
Land spreading systems
Monitoring systems
Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive Wastewater treatment systems
New processes (cleaner techs.)
Water quality monitoring
Modelling systems
Dangerous Substances into Water Directive
Industrial companies
Wastewater treatment systems
New processes (cleaner techs.)
Water quality monitoring
Modelling systems
Nitrates Directive Agricultural enterprises Animal waste storage facilities
Waste treatment systems
Water quality monitoring
Modelling systems
Waste management
Municipal Waste Incineration Directives Municipalities, waste
utilities/companies
Municipal waste incinerators Waste collection/transport
Air quality monitoring
Hazardous Waste Incineration Directive Industry, waste utilities, hospitals Hazardous waste incinerators Waste collection/transport
Air quality monitoring
Landfill Directive Municipalities, waste
utilities/companies, industry
Municipal waste landfill sites
Hazardous waste landfill sites
Closure of old landfills
Waste collection/transport
Water/groundwater monitoring
Industrial pollution control
Integrated Pollution Prevention & Control Directive Industry, agri-industry, waste utilities New processes (cleaner techs.)
Pollution control systems
Air/water/groundwater monitoring
Large Combustion Plant Directive Industry, energy utilities New processes (cleaner techs.)
Air pollution control systems
Air quality monitoring
Solvents Directive Industry incl. SMEs New processes (cleaner techs.)
Air pollution control systems
Air quality monitoring
Source: ECOTEC internal working documents (PEPA project).PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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The EU Commission drew the lesson from the previous enlargement not
to take “yes” for an answer but to require proof, ex ante, of the ability to
observe Community law in practice. In the context of CEEC enlargement,
the problem of raising capital plant to the required standard could be
expected to be much larger, not only because of relatively high degrees of
industrialisation – and hence a high number of pollution sources – and the
historical neglect of socialist economies of the environment, but also
because per capita GDP was half the level of the candidates of the
previous round of enlargement.
Thus, in order to mobilise local resources early on, the Commission
needed 1) to make a credible physical investment  level  part of the
environmental  acquis test and 2) convince both the candidate countries
and the Western donor community of the magnitude of the task.
To achieve these aims, the Commission staged what can be described as a
successful public relations coup with the publication of a study entitled
Compliance Costing for Approximation of EU Environmental Legislation
in the CEECs (EDF, 1997), showing the need to invest between 110 and
120 billion ecu to meet the acquis (see Table 2). In spite of considerable
methodological weaknesses – pointed out in the study itself – this result
still stood until 2001 and was accepted by the candidate countries.
The exercise put the candidate countries on notice that a major
investment effort was needed. However, there was and is a danger
associated with these “headline” numbers – they seem impossibly large.
A (political) hurdle that cannot be overcome lacks credibility. Another
problem with the large figure is that it leaves no intermediate and
therefore enforceable target even in the pre-accession phase.
In response to this problem, The Commission is exerting general pressure
through an unprecedented annual screening, in which public judgement is
passed  on all three elements of the  acquis-readiness test, including
investment. Progress on the legal and administrative elements of the
acquis,  however,  is easier to diagnose than progress on investment,
especially for projects in various planning stages. Nevertheless, much like
the practice in schools, the screening process allows “grades” to be given
for “effort” without using precise tests of achievement. Unfortunately,
this practice also suggests that “effort” is all that is needed,  ignoring
fundamental constraints and avoiding a comprehensive look at real
options.8
Table 2. The 1997 study: Investment for approximation in the CEECs (billions of ECU)
a
Water Waste Total investment
Supply Waste-
water
Total Air Min Max Total
min
b
Total
max
b
Total/
capita
Poland 4.4 13.7 18.1 13.9 2.2 3.3 34.1 35.2 927
Hungary 3.5 3.1 6.6 2.7 2.1 4.4 11.5 13.7 1306
Czech Rep. 2.2 1.1 3.3 6.4 8
d 3.8
d 10.4 13.4 1427
Slovakia 1.0 0.9 1.9 1.9 0.3
d 1.60
d 4.1 5.4 760
Bulgaria 2.2 2.7 4.9 5.1 1.8 5.1 11.7 15.0 1668
Romania 3.8 6.3 10.1 9.1 1.0 2.7 20.2 22.0 943
Baltic total 8.45 0.45 0.85 8.90 9.30 1148
Estonia 0.13 1.38 1.50 1.50 1.50 N/A
Latvia 0.11 1.60 1.71 1.71 1.71 N/A
Lithuania 0.11 2.27 2.38 2.38 2.38 N/A
Slovenia N/A
c N/A N/A 0.69 1.15 1.15 1.84 1.84 N/A
Total 17.5 33.1 50.5 48.2 9.7 22.7 108.4 121.5 1140
% of total 14 27 42 40 19 100
a Figures for water supply, air and waste are based on IFO; for wastewater on IFO and WRC.
b Total minimum includes the minimum estimate for landfill; total maximum includes the maximum estimate for waste
management.
c N/A = Not available.
d 70% of the total estimate of the IFO Institute for the Czech and Slovak Republics can be attributed to the Czech Republic and
30% to the Slovak Republic.
Source: EDC (1997, p. 104).PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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As a partial response to the slow pace of implementation of investment
strategies, the Commission established a new pre-accession condition: the
presentation of a timetable and a comprehensive and “funded” strategy
for investments to be undertaken after accession.
This requires a considerable planning effort on the part of the candidate
countries, as well as clear and transparent standards on what constitutes a
credible strategy. In particular, it forces candidates to list expected
sources of funding for each type of investment. There are two sources
that are particularly interesting: EU transfers and private investment.
Specifying expected funding (from  Phare/ISPA/SAPARD) is relatively
straightforward in the pre-accession phase, as there is no choice other
than to accept the financial framework of Agenda 2000 for the time
being. It puts the candidate countries in an awkward position, however, as
regards the post-accession phase, as the re-distribution of the Regional
and Cohesion Funds is itself a matter for negotiation – indeed perhaps the
single most important one from the standpoint of both the candidates and
present beneficiaries.
As regards private finance, there is the temptation (on both sides) to use it
as a residual  that is assumed to cover all expenditure that cannot be
funded by domestic budgets and European transfers. As will be discussed
below, private finance is, however, a less than straightforward notion in
the world of utilities where much of the heavy investment burden falls. In
particular, it is usually part of a mix in which IFI financing plays a critical
role. That kind of funding either directly (revenue contracts) or indirectly
(guarantees) creates a charge on the public budget and a deficit to which
it is supposed to be an alternative.
This situation  creates a political and financial trap for the Union. The
more realistic and detailed the long-range plan submitted by the candidate
countries, the more clearly the objective limits to the accession efforts
will be revealed, whether expressed as a share in GDP, a share of current
budgetary spending or additions to public debt. It will then be for the
Union to argue that this effort is not enough and delay entry sine die; or
accept the de facto transition periods that are revealed by the expenditure
estimates and that can only be undertaken after accession. The balance of
the moral and technical arguments – financial prudence – will favour the
candidate countries, putting the onus of acceleration of the investment
programme back to the issue of EU transfers.
A more recent (June 2001) estimate by the Commission (European
Commission, 2001), largely based on detailed national planning in the
candidate countries, lowered the estimate by 10 to  20%. See Table 3.10
Table 3. 1997 figures compared with revised financing costs (2001) (€ billions)
BG CY CZ EE H LV LT MT PL RO SK SI Total
Total cost
estimates
(1997
study)
15.0 1.1-
1.3 13.4 1.5 13.7 1.7 2.4 N/A 35.2 22.0 5.4 1.84 122.6-
122.7
Total costs
(recent
figures)
8.6 1.09
6.6-
9.4 4.4
4.1-
10.0
1.5-
2.4 1.6 0.13
22.1-
42.8 22.0 4.8 2.4
79.3-
110.0
Sources: EDF (1997) and European Commission (2001).PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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In order to devise timely policy responses, it is necessary to look in detail
at the aggregate figures, understand the microeconomic choices hidden
behind “working assumptions” and focus pre-accession cooperation much
more directly on the broader institutional context in which
microeconomic decisions on environmental investments are taken.
Since the newer figures are not based on a common methodology, some
of the following discussion of the assumptions is based on the previous
1997 study.
2.3 Putting investment costs into perspective
The headline figure for needed investments – some €110 billion – is both
too high and too low. It is misleadingly low because the follow-on costs,
especially for public budgets, are not properly counted: financial costs,
routine operating costs and maintenance. The estimates are, however,
unnecessarily high as regards the initial investment, as they reflect a
world of traditional public planning and pricing that leaves large
efficiency reserves unexploited. This is the core concern of this study.
The following table shows that in the case of Poland at least, the
estimates of investment costs of the EDC study are roughly twice those of
two other studies undertaken at roughly the same time.
6 More precisely,
the EDC estimate corresponds to the upper range of the World Bank
estimate, but is twice the lower range. The difference between these two
describes the scope for policy.
Table 4. Comparison of investment costs for compliance, Poland
Sector WB estimate
($ billion)
TME estimate
($ billion)
EDC estimate
($ billion)
Drinking water 3-8 0.1 5
Wastewater collection
and treatment
9-13 8 16
Local and long-range
air pollution
5-14 5 16
Waste 3-4 4 3-4
TOTAL 19-39 17 40
Source: World Bank (1999b, Table 3.2, p. 16).
                                                                
6  On the other hand, studies undertaken by Hungary, Estonia  and  others
reportedly confirm the EDC estimates. One can only speculate as to possible
methodological and even political reasons for these latter results.WOLFGANG HAGER
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2.3.1 Unit costs
The baseline figure for all approximation cost calculations is the unit cost
of installations and  works required to treat sewage, retro-fit power
stations, etc. By way of example, the following table shows truly striking
cost ranges found in various studies for one particularly technology-
intensive item, the control of air pollution from “heavy combustion”
sources.
Table 5. Unit costs for air pollution control technology
Cost/unit (NLG/kg)
Low high
Power retrofit (85%) 1.00 1.80
Power retrofit (85-95%) 2.50 6.0
Power new (85%) 0.90 1.50
Power new (85-95%) 2.10 4.50
Industry (limestone
washing/fluidised bed)
1.10 1.70
Process
3.40 12.20
10.00 25.00
SO2
Degussa
Limestone
Lye stripping 3.00 9.00
0.40 3.20
Fireplace adjustment
Gas
Coal 0.40 3.80
Low NOx burner
0.80 4.20
6.60 13.30
0.80 2.50
NOx
Industry
Small boilers
Gas turbines
Steam injection turbines 2.80 20.00
NOx -OUT Ureum 0.70 2.50
7.00 55.00 SCR Gas
Coal 17.00 140.00
Industry 1.70 13.00 Flue gas
recirculation(NOx) Small boilers 25.00 55.00
0.04 0.12 Gas cyclone
(particulates)
Coal
Brown coal 0.05 0.15
0.00 0.46 2-step electro filter Coal
Brown coal 0.00 0.57
0.57 5.70 3-step electro or
cloth/fabric filter
Coal
Brown coal 0.64 10.00
Source: EDC (1997, p. 73).PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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The figures indicated in Table 5 show at least a range of 1:2 between the
lowest and highest estimate; many show a range of 1:3; and some show a
difference of 1:6 between the lowest and the highest figure!
These differences can be partially explained by scale economies and
differences in technology and performance. More important are
differences in the prices charged by different manufacturers. These
differences point to the importance of transparency and sophistication in
the procurement process. In policy terms, this suggests:
-  the need for true international tenders, unconstrained by the promise
of national or corporate supplier credits, and
-  the importance of associating third parties, in particular banks, as
sources of techno-economic know-how.
The good news is that these 1997 prices, whether high or low, are falling
in real terms
7 over the period relevant for  acquis compliance. In
engineering, real unit prices tend to fall as manufacturers streamline their
processes and write off initial development costs over larger deliveries.
This relationship is pointed out in most studies, but is then ignored in
modelling the future capital costs of accession.
Unit cost data provide, however, an incomplete picture of the possible
technical cost savings. They take the size of the plant as given, although
sensible policies may reduce demand for power, water or waste
treatment. In the power sector, the seeming need for costly retrofitting an
old plant may simply be avoided by shutting it down. In the water sector,
the most dramatic savings derive from the scale of the plants. These can
be both too large, compromising the technical efficiency  especially  of
bio-mechanical processes, or too small, i.e. below the most efficient
scale.
At this stage of the argument, the general point to make is that the initial
purchase price of capital goods is not a fixed sum and leaves a large, in
some cases very large, scope for cost savings. A second cost factor,
which may already be prejudiced by poor choices in the initial
investment, is annual operating costs – labour, maintenance, energy
consumption, etc. The knowledge with which to make efficient decisions
can be obtained or purchased. The critical point is the incentive to do so,
i.e. creating a framework that imposes economic discipline in a full, life-
cycle perspective. Equally important, especially for scale economies, is to
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place decision-making power at the appropriate level – which may not be
the municipalities which are often the most readily available project
promoters.
Therefore, the preliminary conclusion to draw is that it is very short-
sighted and, as will be shown, counterproductive, to consider finding
finance for investment as the main critical variable for public authorities
– local, national or European. The (economic) quality of investment
should itself be considered a strategic vector, requiring attention to the
framework in which decisions are taken, i.e. to institutional issues.
2.3.2 Investment costs and true costs
The initial purchase of equipment or construction cost is only part of the
real cost to either the economy or the budget. The broader, more realistic
measure of spending on the environment imposed by the  acquis is the
sum of:
-  the initial investment,
-  financing costs and
-  current operating costs.
Current operating costs can be divided into: 1) the daily management of
the facility, including manpower, raw materials and energy where
applicable; and 2) annual maintenance and major maintenance cycles,
and associated spare parts expenditure.
The usual method used to estimate the true costs of investment is to take
the initial investment cost and  to  add a sector-specific percentage of
operating costs and a cost-of-finance charge. This  approach  has two
drawbacks.
First, the operating costs are themselves potential targets for policy. In the
public sector, for instance, high manpower levels and unrealised
outsourcing opportunities often double the costs compared to those
obtainable under efficient management regimes.
Secondly, counting all operating costs of new investment as additional to
the status quo neglects the cost of operating existing facilities under an
implied no-investment reference case. Old power or water plants in the
CEECs have inordinately high maintenance costs, not least because the
replacement rate of worn-out parts is very high and constitutes a
disguised and permanent form of “investment”. These plants may also
have a technically determined low-labour productivity, which is added to
the politically imposed over-manning.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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The table below seeks to show schematically how a new plant, by adding
30 cost units to the headline acquis investment account, may actually
save 10 units of public expenditure over the life of the investment. The
logic is the same that causes capital equipment to be so rapidly replaced
in the private sector – cycles of five years for productive machinery are
not uncommon in manufacturing. But even in the slower-moving world
of heavy utilities, capital rejuvenation pays for itself over time in
productivity – with the environmental improvement as merely a bonus.
Table 6. Net savings through investment
Capital
cost
Maintenance Operation
(15 years)
Total
Status quo 0 40 50 90
New facility 30 20 30 80
The lower operational costs assumed are derived from technical progress
inevitably incorporated into new plant:
-  a modest 3% compound labour productivity improvement over 20
years, and
-  a substantial savings in energy efficiency and use of raw materials
where applicable.
However, this sort of calculation provides some comfort only as regards
replacement investment, e.g. of old power stations. For the single most
important sector of expenditure, water, this is less relevant. The treatment
facilities and sewerage systems mandated by the  acquis  are  often
additional to what exists today, so that associated operating costs must be
fully counted. The same applies to waste facilities, whether discharges or
incinerators, that replace “costless” unregulated dumps.
2.3.3 The cost of finance
In calculating the annualised costs reproduced elsewhere in this study, the
World Bank used a 12% rate for the cost of money. This method of
calculation is questionable, since it is partially derived from a different
decision-making context. When judging the economic viability of a
single project,  including social economic returns, the Bank applies a
threshold, which used to be 10% and now is 12% for the CEECs. This
helps the public sector to think in terms of opportunity costs and thus to
use public money prudently.WOLFGANG HAGER
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A desirable rate of return,  however,  does not equal the actual cost of
money, especially in an area where sovereign-guarantee loans are
available. A more common assumption, which is reasonable for at least
the more politically stable and larger countries, for much of the forecast
15-year period would be a 3% real interest rate for money largely
borrowed by central government and/or obtained through IFI credits. The
difference between the two rates, assuming a 15-year payback period, is
58% of the total capital cost. That is, a plant costing €100 million would
require a total budget outlay of either €196 or €124 million – a difference
of almost 60%.
In one World Bank country report (World Bank, 1999a, p. 173), the 12%
interest rate is assumed specifically for the Czech water sector, with the
argument that investors in the privatised (and  comparatively  low-risk)
UK water sector are claiming 6-9% as their cost of capital. But not only
are these UK rates presumably nominal rates and combine bank debt with
expensive equity, they also apply to a non-recourse, i.e. non-sovereign
guarantee, environment without access to preferential IFI lending.
2.3.4 The acquis cost/GDP ratio
One of the striking features of studies estimating environmental acquis
costs is that total costs (investment plus operating costs) are only shown
on a per capita annual basis and not expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Only the crude initial investment costs are shown in per GDP ratios. In
the only case where total annual costs have been expressed in terms of
GDP, it is as a percentage of 2015 GDP. This still yields a high figure,
although GDP will have more than doubled by then.  The true picture
emerges if one compares these annualised expenditures to the GDP of the
early years.
Recalculating a World Bank  estimate that shows a 3.7% share of total
environmental accession costs in 2015 GDP for (only!) the three most
important areas yields a cost of compliance of over 7% of GDP in 2000!
(see Table 7).
Even with the caveats on possible overestimation regarding unit costs,
financing costs and net operating costs, these figures are truly daunting,
especially as they exclude non-compliance-related spending  from
environmental  and administrative expenditures. Assuming a “reasonable”
expenditure on the environment at double the average EU figure of 1% of
GDP, they suggest something like a 30-year transition period.
                                                                
8 World Bank (1999a), p. 173.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
17
The usual representation of acquis costs in terms of per capita thus hides
from view a crucial magnitude, which must be faced squarely by policy-
makers. The implicit strategic issue cannot be settled in “chapter”
screenings, but requires an early and comprehensive look at the figures
before the Agenda 2000 review exercises in 2002 and 2003 and,  a
fortiori, assessing “Maastricht” compliance at the moment of accession
and planning post-accession Regional Fund spending.
Table 7. Compliance costs as a share of GDP: Poland
Air Water Total* Year
Low High Low High Low High
2000 1.13 3.63 1.48 2.51 3.4 7.34
2001 1.08 3.46 1.41 2.4 3.24 7
2002 1.02 3.29 1.34 2.27 3.07 6.64
2003 0.97 3.15 1.28 2.18 2.92 6.36
2004 0.93 2.98 1.22 2.06 2.79 6.03
2005 0.88 2.85 1.16 1.97 2.66 5.76
2006 0.84 2.72 1.1 1.88 2.52 5.49
2007 0.80 2.58 1.05 1.79 2.41 5.22
2008 0.76 2.46 1 1.7 2.29 4.97
2009 0.73 2.34 0.95 1.62 2.19 4.72
2010 0.69 2.23 0.91 1.54 2.08 4.5
2011 0.66 2.13 0.86 1.47 1.98 4.3
2012 0.62 2.02 0.82 1.4 1.88 4.08
2013 0.59 1.93 0.78 1.33 1.79 3.9
2014 0.57 1.83 0.75 1.27 1.71 3.71
2015 0.54 1.75 0.71 1.21 1.63 3.53
* Includes additional sectors, such as solid waste management.
Source: Recalculated from World Bank (1999b, Table 3.1, p. 15). Assumed GDP growth
is 5% per annum from 2000-15.
In the following sections, two approaches are used to reduce these
numbers to tolerable proportions, keeping in mind the promise of savings
at the level of unit costs (Table 5) and the wide spread in estimates in
aggregate costs (Table 6). The first is to look at the share of these costs
which occur in the market ( tradeables) sector, where they all but
disappear in a broader competitiveness perspective. The second approach
is to look at public-sector spending and explore ways to lower the costs
of compliance through improved management and efficiency-oriented
policies.
Before turning to these matters, two short comments may serve to
provide a preliminary measure of comfort when faced with the
discouraging numbers of Table 7. The first concerns the impact of growthWOLFGANG HAGER
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on expenditures; the second points out economic and even budgetary
benefits to be derived from environmental investment.
2.3.5 Macroeconomic factors
Economic growth assumptions have a misleadingly perverse effect on
numbers for the cost of acquis investment. Thus, a 5% compound growth
rate almost doubles the calculated energy needs for industry by 2015 and
hence the cost of associated abatement investments. For cars, it almost
triples the numbers and thus the notional costs of “adding” catalytic
converters.
In fact, the real financial problem of meeting the  acquis is more
manageable under a high-growth scenario.  The rate of capital
rejuvenation – i.e. closure of older capacity – accelerates under higher
growth, allowing investment in new capacity with  built-in pollution
abatement. Tax receipts rise faster than growth itself (higher incomes and
profits yield more than proportionally higher tax receipts), thus making
the provision of quality public services more affordable. Moreover, in the
case of one heavy-investment sector, water,  private demand would rise
only modestly under a high-growth scenario, i.e. more money would be
available to pay for the same physical investment.
This does, however, underline the need for “sustainability”, i.e. the
adoption of environmental policies that do not damage economic growth
either through a general rise in costs or through an induced permanent
fiscal crisis which would lead to a permanent austerity stance in
economic management.
2.3.6 Benefits
Some representations of the environmental cost of accession treat these
costs as a deadweight loss on the economy – a kind of accession tax paid
to satisfy the preoccupations and values of rich Protestant countries in the
EU. Even the IFIs speak of long-term benefits that are difficult to explain
to cash-strapped consumers who may have to pay more for their daily
needs.
The Commission is about to publish a study that examines the benefits
side in some detail. In our effort to put the “headline” figure of accession
costs into perspective, it is worth flagging some of these benefits – i.e.
those that translate into cash savings and/or improved tax returns for
public authorities from a more productive private economy. First among
these monetary socio-economic benefits is health. Public expenditure is
avoided by a reduced incidence of sickness, such as that caused byPAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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lowered resistance through an ambient cocktail of chemicals, respiratory
illnesses, hygiene compromised by a lack of sewerage, etc. The economy
benefits from fewer work days lost and the higher productivity associated
with wellness. This same study estimates these benefits at around 3% of
GDP annually.
9
Another sector likely to benefit is tourism, both  in urban and natural
settings, where less grime on buildings and better air quality add to the
attractiveness of the urban and rural  patrimony in the CEECs. Foreign
investment has been shown to respond to the attractiveness and safety of
competing locations.
It is likely that all these benefits together may add up to at least 0.2% of
GDP, which would net out one-tenth of an assumed 2% of GDP spent on
the environment. Other benefits of an improved environment, however,
take the form of a direct, if non-monetary consumer benefit – cleaner air,
safe drinking water, a landscape  free  from unsightly and dangerous
landfills. These benefits do not show up in GDP, but represent as much
real value as a better consumer product commanding a premium price.
(Many of these benefits are, of course, actually paid for through higher
user charges and cannot be double-counted in a non-monetary benefit
argument.)
                                                                
9 These numbers are not directly relevant in a public finance perspective, as they
use i.a. value-of-life estimates based on individual preferences rather than, say,
human-capital productivity.20
CHAPTER 3
INVESTMENT BY PRIVATE INDUSTRY
As stated in the  introductory chapter, only the public budget (deficit)
constitutes an absolute, non-negotiable constraint on the candidate
countries’ ability to carry out acquis investments. A considerable share of
the total investment charge falls, however, on manufacturing industry.
Thus, data for the Czech Republic show that half of the “big-ticket”
expenditures in the field of air pollution and waste management can be
shifted off the public budget under certain assumptions.
An even-larger private share is obtained if the power (generating) sector
is also counted in this category, as electricity is now becoming an
internationally traded sector. The industrial tradables sector as a whole
thus represents the single-best hope to shift acquis investment off-budget.
In this  chapter it is argued that it would be wrong to consider these
investments as a “charge” on the nation in the same way that investments
by public utilities are often regarded. However, in reality, many heavy
engineering and large chemical companies in the CEECs are still under
public ownership or, even if formally privatised, depend on the public
banking sector for working and investment capital – effectively subsidies.
In both cases, environmental investment ultimately generates a charge on
public accounts. This may be one reason why both CEEC and EU acquis-
compliance estimates do not clearly distinguish between public and
private costs of compliance.
By 2005, however, with few exceptions, private or mixed ownership of
industry will be the rule in countries seriously considering accession, if
only because the reform of the banking system will remove the means of
subsidising such enterprises by the backdoor.
10 In a more long-term
perspective, the assumption that “industry” means private, and hence off-
budget investment, stands.
The case of power is a special one, as this sector shares some of the
characteristics of (other, public) utilities considered in  Chapter 5.
However, as is explained in section 4.2 below, it can and should largely
be treated like manufacturing industry, at least as regards generation.
                                                                
10 For a description of state subsidies via the banking sector and government
guarantees, see e.g. World Bank (1999a, Chapter III on “Contingent Liabilities”
and Chapter VII, “The Financial Sector”).PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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3.1  Investment by manufacturing industry
The main directives relevant to  the  manufacturing industry and their
associated investment costs are summarised in Table 8 below.
Table 8. Private sector acquis investment
Directives Heavy investment Other investment
Nitrates
Directives
Animal waste storage
facilities
Waste treatment systems
Water quality monitoring
Modelling systems
IPPC
Directive
Pollution control systems
New processes (cleaner
technologies)
Air/water/groundwater
monitoring
Dangerous
Substances
into Water
Directive
Wastewater treatment
systems
New processes (cleaner
technologies)
Water quality monitoring
Modelling systems
Hazardous
Waste
Incineration
Directive
Hazardous waste
incinerators
Waste collection/transport
Air quality monitoring
Solvents
Directive
New processes (cleaner
technologies)
Air pollution control
systems
Air quality monitoring
Large
Combustion
Plant
Directive
New processes (cleaner
technologies)
Air pollution control
systems
Air quality monitoring
Source: ECOTEC, Internal working paper, PEPA project.
There are no global estimates for compliance costs to industry as such.
Some figures can help, however, to illustrate the nature and size of the
investment effort.
Table 9 refers to annualised costs of compliance with the waste directives
for Polish industry. It shows that the largest costs arise from responsible
management of industrial waste in the non-ferrous metal industry and
hazardous waste for the chemical industry.
The costs of compliance to the EU acquis to be borne by industry are not
limited to investments. Water and electricity tariffs will rise significantly,
as will the cost of waste disposal by third parties. From an internal market
perspective, this rise in costs is desirable – much of the fear ofWOLFGANG HAGER
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environmental dumping (“distortion of competition”) relates to
potentially lower current costs.
Under a rigorous privatisation scenario, the cost of investment itself is
taken off the public budget but the administrative cost of insuring
compliance rises. This not only involves public spending on qualified
manpower, but also physical investment in monitoring and testing
equipment.
This is eminently an area where 75% grant funding from ISPA could play
a role. Provided demands for such equipment are bundled so as to exceed
the €5 million threshold operated by ISPA,  linking such demands for
funding to integrated plans, such as basin development, would greatly
strengthen the chances  of receiving funding. More generally, however,
the upgrading of “administrative capacity” required under the  acquis
should be given high priority, if only because the presence of an effective
inspection mechanism is the only credible signal for many, especially
smaller industries, that controls are serious. “Cowboy” investments,
including  those  by foreign  SMEs hoping to benefit from transitional
weaknesses of enforcement structures, can thus be discouraged.
Table 9. Annual costs for the Polish Environmental Policy Plan, 2000,
additional costs in comparison with 1991.  “High-growth
market-based policy” scenario (MECU)
Sector SO2 NOx Particles Total
Paper 5.78 0.94 10.63 17.34
Refineries 24.65 5.10 0.85 30.60
Org. chemicals 17.77 1.70 12.07 31.54
Fertiliser 6.55 0.34 5.36 12.24
Other chemicals 43.35 3.15 65.28 111.78
Iron and steel 125.89 4.08 35.28 165.24
Non-ferrous metals 33.83 0.34 9.61 43.78
Power 263.25 96.63 349.44 708.31
Total 521.05 111.27 488.5 1,120.81
Source: EDC (1997, Table 5.4, p. 74).
The budgetary expenditures for enforcement are, however, partially offset
by savings from the public budget derived from effective enforcement
itself. Thus, to the extent that industries treat their effluents before
discharge, both the  public costs of drinking water purification and
sewage treatment can be reduced. Similarly, the cost of cleaning up waste
dumps and managing existing ones is not unrelated to the enforcement of
directives dealing with solid and hazardous wastes from private industry.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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There should thus be strong resistance by the candidate countries’
negotiating teams to pleas for transition periods from domestic industries,
or to collusion in non-enforcement once acquis-conforming legislation is
adopted. It is not just the environment minister who should object, but the
finance and health ministers as well.
Initially, mass “privatisation” has not necessarily led to better
economic or environmental performance in enterprises. In
some countries governments hold minimum shares in
enterprises and sometimes provide credits and subsidies that
shield these enterprises from competition. In other countries,
the new owners are former managers from the period of state
ownership who have found it easier to maximise personal
wealth by selling corporate assets and obtaining subsidies than
by improving corporate performance in the marketplace. In
addition, political will to enforce environmental requirements
has been weak in many countries (OECD, 1998).
3.2  The Internal Market
The Internal Market is one of the most powerful driving forces of
environmental policy-making in the Union, as concerns over market
distortions require EU-level action related to environmental problems that
might otherwise have been left to national action.
11
National environmental policies can distort the market in two principal
ways:
- The regulation of process technology to the extent that this affects
costs, and
- product standards.
Initial concerns over environmental dumping as a result of  Eastern
enlargement were chiefly related to process-relevant regulations. The
effect of varying product standards on the Internal Market is subtler.
Business incurs costs when it has to adjust products to different markets.
This is not only true for exports, but may also occur when producing
                                                                
11 This can have a downside in holding back environmentally advanced countries
which, on the other hand, have an interest in the adoption of their potentially
costly standards at the Community level. Whatever the balance as regards
environmental protection, it remains true that without the Internal Market there
would be far fewer binding rules at Community level.WOLFGANG HAGER
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locally (FDI) and when design, capital equipment and supply chains have
to be adjusted to suit different requirements.
In the enlargement negotiations, the concerns of the Industry Directorate
as expressed in its White Paper on the Internal Market and the
Environment seem to be limited to this aspect:
The White Paper includes legislation which directly affects
the free movement of good and services, leaving out
legislation which relates to pollution from stationary
sources and to  processes rather than products...[emphasis
added]. The result is that most environmental legislation is
not covered.
12
By implication, this larger share of the environmental acquis is a matter
for environmental policy as such.
The consensus of the business community closely parallels this
assessment. It insists that the environmental  acquis related to product
standards must be implemented in full before accession, while the
implementation of process standards is negotiable from an Internal
Market point of view.
13
Both  of  these stances seem to conflict with a diffuse concern over
competitiveness present in both the candidate countries and the Union.
Some in the present EU fear that permissive process standards within a
larger single market would lead to environmental dumping. For the
candidate countries, there is a fear of being forced to make costly
additional investments that would erode their ability to compete and, at
the margin, force them to take some plant out of production altogether.
3.2.1  The environmental effects of competitive capital rejuvenation
Both sets of fears are largely unfounded. In making this argument, one
needs to distinguish between the manufacture of finished products on the
one hand, and bulk commodities such as steel, aluminium and other
metals, bulk petrochemicals, etc. on the other.
As regards finished products, the option of gaining market share through
cost advantages from “dirty” production methods is not really available.
Old, polluting capital equipment is also inefficient with respect to energy
                                                                
12  http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/update/general/263en.pdf (June
1999).
13 An exception is electric power generation; see section 3.2.2 below.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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and labour productivity, outweighing any advantage from polluting
practices. Secondly, such plant cannot deliver the product quality
(precision, uniformity and reliability) required in an increasingly
sophisticated market for capital goods, components and consumer goods.
Such plant will therefore be scrapped after enlargement, if not before.
When such outdated plant is replaced by modern equipment, this has to
be procured from Western capital goods producers, which have
“internalised” decades of environmental legislation. Such plant may not
fulfil the criteria of “clean technology”, but it is designed to minimise
environmental impacts as imposed by current law.
Perhaps surprisingly, some of the same mechanism applies to much of the
lower end of manufacturing, i.e. processed or semi-finished commodities.
Here too, product-quality standards and consistency demanded by
industrial customers are of growing importance and require new,
sophisticated process technology. Another powerful economic force
requiring the scrapping of old, polluting plant is the price of energy.
Since 1997, the EU Commission has insisted that all new investment in
the candidate countries had to fully comply with the regulatory  acquis.
This means that the very notion of transition periods for the acquis as
regards the regulation of industrial processes can only relate to older
capital stock, which is rapidly shrinking anyway and indeed is
condemned to be replaced in an enlarged market by competitive forces.
“Grandfathering” existing plant beyond the date of accession would just
delay the inevitable. In practice, these plants would need to be subsidised
and their markets limited to non-OECD customers.
Thus, if candidate countries are concerned over the gap between the
environmental performance of their industries and the  acquis, and
worried about the cost of meeting the  acquis, they are simply
underestimating the much larger process of capital rejuvenation triggered
by integration into the European market, and hence overestimating the
cost of environmental compliance.
Does this mean that the roughly one-third of estimated compliance costs
that occur in the tradable sector can be removed entirely from the
calculus? Yes, as regards the public budget, assuming full privatisation
and/or the full application of EU rules regarding subsidies. No, to the
extent that the built-in  acquis-conformity of modern productive plant
does not cover “optional” end-of-pipe treatment of effluents or emissions.
To survive in the pricing and quality environment of the Internal Market,
these plants have to be closed down or refitted in any case. Privatisation
prior to environmental investment may mean that the governmentWOLFGANG HAGER
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receives little or no money for the sale of large physical assets. But this
low market value simply reflects reality. Hiding that reality through the
public banking system will, at any rate, not be an option much longer.
Under status quo practices, these industries and power stations are a
liability for the economy,  for  the budget and most certainly for the
environment-acquis-readiness of the countries concerned.
3.2.2 Power generation
The problem is more complex in the power sector. Here, effective EU
liberalisation is a near-term prospect. However, the market perversely
rewards old polluting plant  – the reverse of the situation in
manufacturing. This advantage derives chiefly from the fact that these are
older plants whose capital cost has been written off, while newer plants in
the EU that conform to the acquis must still amortise their cost of capital.
In this area, therefore, Internal Market requirements strongly suggest the
need for a 100% technical compliance at the moment of entry. (For the
purpose of competitiveness, it may be sufficient to have “financial
closure” of investment projects, as this would affect pricing
immediately.)
This would either require retrofitting old power stations, or replacing
them with new, e.g. gas-powered, plants. In either case, any power station
still in public ownership would pose a major burden on public budgets.
There is thus a strong case for transferring power generation totally to the
private sector – a process far advanced in many candidate countries.
The importance of the power sector in the overall expenditure for air
pollution control appears from the following table for the Czech
Republic. More importantly, this shows that the quasi-totality of
expenditures for acquis compliance would fall on the private sector under
a radical privatisation scenario. The estimate by the World Bank assumes
a roughly 50/50 split between the public and private sectors, in part
because district heating – typically municipal utilities – requires extensive
interventions. With a privatised power sector, the split would be about
30/70, taking two-thirds of this large item off the public accounts.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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Table 10. Cost estimates for air pollution control in the Czech Republic
(in millions of €)
Item Investment Recurrent
Low High Low High
Extension of the state administration - - 1 2
Monitoring improvement - - 6 6
Stationary pollution sources (adapting
incinerators)
a
28 28 6 6
Stationary pollution sources (new incinerators)
a 275 413 55 83
Avoiding water pollution around incinerators 8 8 - -
Improving oil production technology
b 275 275 28 28
Elimination of asbestos 17 17 - -
Elimination of ozone-damaging compounds 28 28 - -
Finishing effective salvage network 14 28 - -
Improving forest protection against air pollution - - 1 2
District heating
c 250 623 44 125
Power sector
d 182 182 27 27
Overall cost 1,074 1,628 164 274
   Of which financed by local government (%) 41 48
   Of which financed by private sector (%) 58 52
a Recurrent expenditures were estimated at 20% of capital costs.
b  Recurrent expenditures were estimated at 10% of capital costs.
c  These calculations are based on the need for 3,600 MW new generating capacity
(380,000 households living in 60-square meter apartments consuming 0.16 kW per square
meter). The high estimate assumes that all of this capacity will be coal-fired and the cost
of fitting pollution control equipment is $150 million/1,000 MW for SO2 reduction and
$20 million/1,000 MW for NOx reduction. The low estimate assumes that half of the new
generating capacity will be gas-fired, which requires no additional expenditure to comply
with environmental standards, and that the cost of meeting both SO2 and NOx standards on
the coal-fired portion of the new plant will be $120 million/1,000 MW.
d It includes additional strictly environmental investments by the Czech Power Company,
CEZ.
Source: World Bank (1999a, p. 181).
3.2.3 Waste management
Similar comfort can be drawn from  the table below on  waste
management. Here, too, half the expenditure – in the particular case of
the Czech Republic – would fall on the private sector.WOLFGANG HAGER
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Table 11. Waste management investment and recurrent costs
(millions of €)
Cost type Element
Investment
a Recurrent
b
Financed
by
c
General directives
-Reinforcement of state administration 3.3 S
-Building 2.8 S
Waste management installations
-Reconstruction of hazardous waste
incinerators
15.2 1.5 P
-Process 50% of landfilled bio-
degradable waste
84.6 11.7 M
Specific types of wastes (including
packing waste)
-Elimination of oil waste – shutdown
Ostrava Plant
8.3 1.7 P
-System for collection and landfilling
of oil waste
13.8 1.2 P/M
-System for collection and landfilling
of household waste
13.8 1.2 P/M
-Disposal of PCB waste 82.6 22.0 P
-Collection and recovery of packing
waste
33.1 16.5 P/M
Total 254.0 59.2
Municipal budget (%) 51 38
Private sector (%) 48 56
a This represents a low estimate. A high estimate can bring the total investment cost to about €392
million, with the difference being borne by the private sector.
b This represents a low estimate. A high can bring the total recurrent cost to about €97 million, with
the difference being borne by the private sector.
c It indicates source of financing, i.e. S means state budget, P means private, and M means municipal
or local government budget.
Source: World Bank (1999a, p. 179).29
CHAPTER 4
MARKET EFFICIENCY AND THE COLLECTIVE INTEREST
The evidence presented in the first three chapters suggests inter alia that
a) there is considerable scope for techno-economic efficiency savings and
b)  some of the public-budget constraint can be avoided by the
privatisation and competitive modernisation of (manufacturing) industry.
But most of the investment burden falls on the water and waste sector, i.e.
public service utilities, as well as on power, which combines market and
public service elements. Thus, optimising investments in utilities –
achieving the largest environmental impact for the least cost – becomes a
strategic policy vector for matching the legal and environmental
ambitions of the European Union with available resources.
The remaining chapters argue that, to alter the status quo, EU policy
should not be limited to enforcing quantitative targets, but should focus
directly on the microeconomic and institutional context in which
investment decisions are taken. More specifically, minimising the true
cost of these investments, i.e. including follow-on operational costs,
requires institutional structures for decision-making  that  are subject to
real economic disciplines and take into account the full life-cycle cost of
investment decisions. Last but not least, this section points to the need for
policy at national and EU level to encourage administrative structures and
levels of decision-making that correspond to geographical, ecological and
technical scale requirements. In particular, the size of undertakings, and
hence of physical plant and networks, should not be defined by the formal
devolution of responsibility to hundreds of municipal governments  that
typically dominate the public utility market.
The importance of the institutional framework as a crucial vector for
achieving the ambitious environmental investment targets required for
acquis compliance is not currently recognised in the policy thinking of
the European Union. Rather, its thinking is bound on  one side by law-
defined investment and quantitative targets and by administrative tests of
compliance based on sector expenditures on the other. The notion of
sustainability – i.e. of long-term social, economic and environmental
viability of political choices – has not found its way from EU rhetoric to
the daily work of environmental acquis compliance in the CEECs.
4.1  Efficiency and collective purpose
In theory, economic activities that are under public control or ownership
could be expected to lead to the implementation of public interest goalsWOLFGANG HAGER
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such as protection of  the environment. The evidence shows that
paradoxically, it may be much more difficult to deliver environmental
improvements in certain public utilities than imposing them on the
market sector.
At a general level the reasons are similar to those explaining the dismal
performance of the pre-1989 socialist economies in environmental
matters as compared to the capitalist west. In the west, there was an arms-
length relationship between the public and the private sectors which,
however compromised by corporate lobbying, managed to define the
public interest and set and enforced standards. In the pre-reform east, the
producer and the controller were part of one institution, government, with
the producer view easily winning.
Devolution of effective ownership of utilities to the municipal level has in
theory improved chances for (regulatory) arms-length control by a central
government agency. But financial leverage of the centre has been reduced
by greater administrative and financial autonomy granted to
municipalities. Leverage has also been reduced by the substantial cuts in
subsidies from central government. As regards investment in water and
waste management, therefore, short-term expediency – bad projects are
better than none – have taken the place of comprehensive planning.
Expensive western suppliers armed with ready-made financial packages
have been chosen over intrinsically cheaper solutions. As will be argued
in Chapter 6, section 3, the Union’s own need to disburse IPSA grants as
quickly as possible, and the CEEC governments’ need to demonstrate
“action” as regards pre-accession compliance, also act as support for
existing institutional structures.
Devolution of responsibility of supplying water services to the municipal
level led, for instance, to the creation of 300 water companies in
Hungary, destroying effective levers of government planning at the
requisite geographical and technical scale. Experience in Western Europe
shows that local governments can  cooperate to establish water (and
public transport) services which respect physical rather than
administrative borders. But on a voluntary basis, this may take decades,
given the loss of patronage involved. The  CEECs are not promising
grounds for such self-denial by politicians.
Thus, as regards municipal utilities, the old socialist stress on productive
output over other social concerns is no longer the main obstacle to
environmental investment. Here, the “producer” interest takes the form of
institutional interests – the nexus between politics and public economic
agents. At its most straightforward, social goals other than thePAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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environment are assigned higher priority, notably employment in the
utilities (which crowds out investment funding) and low prices to
consumers. At a less respectable level, utilities are an important source of
patronage for politicians. One way to persuade politicians to give up this
precious asset through privatisation is, of course, corruption, which is
endemic in the water and waste sectors, worldwide.
14
Paradoxically, the traditional socialist priority of producer interest over
the environment is now de facto shared by western institutions concerned
with financial sustainability and growth. Thus, in both the IMF’s and the
Commission’s macroeconomic models, public investment is assumed to
“crowd out” private investment and reduce growth. While the road from
modelling to concrete policy is not  direct, the bias against public
investment is institutionalised, resulting not only in a general squeeze on
public investment, but also support for private investment in utilities even
where it results in high long-term costs to public budgets and/or citizens.
4.2  Off-budget finance
This section examines the implications for investment efficiency of
different forms of financing other than public budgets. “Private finance”
is generally discussed either as an alternative source of money or used
synonymously with privatisation. A closer look at the models being
practised in the world of public-private partnerships (PPPs) shows that
only second-best options are available. Nevertheless, the potential for
financing methods to improve the economics of environmental
investments is considerable.
Table 12. The investment strategy of the Czech Republic: Environment
approximation (2000-05)
Year  (mil. CZK) Source of financing
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Private sector 18 713 24 815 28 465 19 690 16 880 14 500
State budget 1 906 4 045 3 165 2 147 1 865 1 659
State programmes 1 60 60 60 50 50
National Property Fund 5 000 5 000 4 700 0 0 0
Local budgets 2 320 5 400 5 500 3 200 2 700 1 800
Foreign grants 1 120 1 230 1 045 1 045 1 040 1 010
Foreign loans 1 100 2 710 1 210 1 210 600 0
State Env. Fund 2 000 2 290 2 310 1 850 1 500 1 000
Source: Czech Republic (1999).
                                                                
14 See e.g. Hall (1999).32
Table 13. The investment strategy for the Czech Republic, allocation by source and destination
Area of
Intervention
Private
sector
State
budget
State
programmes
National
Property
Fund
Local
budgets
Foreign
loans
State
Environment
Fund
Total
Horizontal
measures
0 71 0 0 0 0 0 71
Air quality 10 340 115 30 0 0 30 0 10 515
Waste management 19 830 100 0 0 1 500 0 250 21 730
Water quality 69 293 14 012 251 14 700 19 420 6 800 10 700 141 706
Nature protection 0 241 0 0 0 0 0 241
Industrial pollution
and control risk
management
22 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 200
Chemical
substances and
genetically
modified organisms
1 400 200 0 0 0 0 0 1 600
Civil defence 0 48 0 0 0 0 0 48
123 063 14 787 281 14 700 20 920 6 830 10 950 198 111
Source: This table is composed from data taken from Czech Republic (1999).
  PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
33
Table 12 above has been re-calculated from data contained in a recent
document submitted to the European Commission by the Czech
Environment Ministry. It shows the private sector meeting over half the
planned investment cost in the pre-accession period. This is all the more
surprising when read together with the figures in Table 13, which shows
the bulk of this investment going to the water utility which remains
wholly in the public sector. Clearly, the term “private financing” is used,
as sometimes in the west, as a synonym for bank financing.
The above figures imply, however, that three-fifth of investments are
being  shifted from the public budget or government funds, relying on
para-fiscal revenues. In utilities,
15 however, such a shift to the private
sector usually involves debt – whether domestic or foreign – backed by
public guarantees and is thus counted as part of the national debt both by
the IMF and the EU. Moreover, even current public budget deficits are
exacerbated for the  duration  of the investment by the (subsidised)
operational costs of new treatment plants, sewage systems, etc. “Private
finance” that is understood as bank finance for traditional public utilities
may thus contribute less than appears at first sight towards alleviating the
long-term budgetary and debt burden of acquis compliance. As will be
pointed out below, however, non-traditional finance is an often-necessary
but not sufficient condition for introducing a framework for investment
decisions which, through improved efficiency, does in fact save money.
4.2.1  The limits of private investment
True private investment comes in two forms, which are often combined
in infrastructure investment. The normal form of financing productive
investment in our economies is through corporate finance – debt or equity
that is issued against the earnings of an enterprise and guaranteed by all
its assets. Project finance, by contrast, is issued for a particular
investment (“project”) and against the earnings stream of that investment
only.
Genuine “non-recourse” project financing is extremely rare in the sectors
traditionally served by public utilities, whether transport, downstream
energy, or water and waste. Project promoters usually  contribute only
symbolic amounts of equity, say 10% of total costs, which in turn is
                                                                
15 Improvements in “air quality”, assigned 100% financing in the above table,
will, as implied in  Chapter 2, largely rely on normal corporate financing by
manufacturing and privatised power companies, as will  “industrial  pollution
control” and “chemical substances”.WOLFGANG HAGER
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guaranteed by their corporate assets.
16 The rest is financed by a
combination of loans, including some from the IFIs, which benefit from
public guarantees (“recourse”) and public grants. Under modern public
accounting, as is required under the Maastricht criteria for economic and
monetary union (and hence accession), public guarantees are counted as
part of the public debt. However, the expenditure does not present a
charge on current budgets. (Subsidies for) follow-on costs or social
pricing do, however, fall on current public budgets.
The difficulty of applying genuinely private financing structures, whether
in the form of corporate or project finance, is linked to two fundamental
characteristics of these sectors. The weakness of the market (monopoly)
and the regulation of prices (which reflects the “political” elements in
these markets).
This is not the place to discuss in detail the different models developed
especially  in  France and Britain to cope with the monopoly problem
while allocating a large role to private enterprise in the provision of
public services, e.g. concessions. Rather, we will discuss ways in which
the form of finance can influence the economic quality of environmental
investments even within a largely public (ownership) context.
In the ideological juxtaposition of private vs. public, the private sector is
considered superior as regards cost control, technical innovation and
customer orientation. Competition is crucial to this outcome; without it,
the performance incentive is reduced to profit maximisation with a much
weaker and sometimes perverse effect on efficiency-derived economic
welfare.
4.2.1.1 The unsuitability of the private regulated monopoly model
To substitute the simple mechanism of market competition as a
framework for private-sector monopolies by regulatory mechanisms
requires an inordinately sophisticated public sector. Some countries
possess this sophistication in abundance –  the US with its regulatory
commissions developed since the 1830s, France with its 200-year-old
system of concessions and the UK with its new hybrid systems – and yet
have produced only mixed results. For middle-income countries with
weak administrations and weaker governance and where essential
supervisory functions have been delegated to municipalities, managing
PPPs is a daunting task.
                                                                
16 In practice, project promoters re-coup this 10% “risk capital” by adding it into
their internal pre-bid calculations, as a margin to their supply price calculations.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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In theory, such shortcomings in the  CEECs can be mitigated or even
avoided altogether through the participation of international financial
institutions in public-private partnership arrangements. While the  IFIs
have certainly prevented the worst, certain institutional features prevent
an entirely robust defence of the public interest. The World Bank has by
far the deepest knowledge of the issues (closely followed by the more
multi-cultural EBRD), but it does not always act accordingly. Political
pressures at Governing Board level, and a general need to increase its
lending portfolio combined with traditional banker’s preference for
bankability can lead to the approval of projects that fall short of a social
optimum. The EIB has only limited staff resources to process its huge
loan portfolio and is handicapped in its critical scrutiny by its
institutionalised respect for the wishes of its sovereign borrowers. For all
IFIs, the sovereign guarantees usually requested create a kind of “moral
hazard”.
17
There is as yet only anecdotal evidence available as regards the
performance of western utility companies taking over or building new
networks or plants in the accession countries. In general, the following
points can be made: The regulatory environment is, not unreasonably, in
constant evolution. This either discourages investment or leads to large
risk premia being factored in the internal calculations of investors. While
the resulting terms may be initially accepted by authorities, they are
subsequently viewed as unfair, giving rise to re-negotiations.
Nevertheless, it is becoming evident that the basic economic constellation
remains unfavourable to FDI in utilities other than power generation.
Basically, FDI implies the import of western equipment at western prices,
to be paid for by consumers having a third or less purchasing power. In
addition, costs are raised by comparatively high transaction costs (some
4% for  legal and financial  consultancy fees) and the risk premium
mentioned earlier. A corruption “tax” of around 15% of contract value is
quite common in the more southern parts of Eastern Europe, although this
applies equally to mere supply contracts.
In addition, especially in the water sector, foreign companies have often
behaved in ways that have de-legitimised their contribution in the
CEECs. Foreign multinationals (mostly French and German) own
specialised water construction and engineering subsidiaries which benefit
from capturing works and maintenance contracts associated with water
                                                                
17 Economic agents take on more risk than they  normally  would  in the
expectation that some of their potential liabilities will be covered by others.WOLFGANG HAGER
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(service) concessions. “The high costs of works contracts was one of the
factors that led the town of Debrecen in Hungary to abandon privatisation
in favour of a public sector solution.”
18 In many cases, the supply of
equipment rather than the long-term provision of water services appears
to have been the major business objective of foreign multinationals.
Studies
19 have shown that local authorities, through local procurement
and competitive tendering, can often build facilities at a lower cost than
western companies, although this may mean doing without seemingly
attractive financing packages, including supplier (export) credits.
There are thus at least three reasons  at present  that argue against the
seemingly convenient option of relying on foreign capital to by-pass the
financing constraint faced by the governments of the accession countries:
-  the weakness of regulatory capacity,
-  expensive transaction costs and risk premia, and
-  short-term profit maximising behaviour by foreign multinationals.
Does this mean that traditional public sector solutions are the only
alternative? To answer in the affirmative would condemn a key sector of
environmental investment to remain islands of state socialism, with all its
shortcomings. The challenge, therefore, is to develop public sector
models of efficient provision that mimic the market as regards incentives
for efficiency. As the following section will demonstrate, external finance
can play a crucial role not just as a source of funding, but as a
management tool.
4.3  Finance as management tool
The manner in which funds for investment in municipal infrastructures
are obtained has consequences for:
-  the general economic discipline in using such monies, and
-  the parameters taken into account in economic decision-making,
notably life-cycle analysis.
All money, including central government funding for local government,
can be considered as debt.
20 The extent to which this is taken into account
                                                                
18 Hall (2001).
19 Internal EIB Memorandum  (2000) and Lobina and Hall (2000, pp. 35-55).
20 Ring-fenced receipts from pollution charges invested by environmental funds
may seem an exception, but they do not alter the fact that government as a whole
in the CEECs does not pay for investment with current tax receipts.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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by the ultimate beneficiaries and for specific investment projects differs
widely according to the form of financing chosen. The table below
summarises the options available for utility investment. In practice,
however, several of these methods may be used to “financially engineer”
an investment. This may blur the lines of responsibility but also, on
occasion, allows the use of “cheap” public money in combination with
more expensive, but “disciplinary” external credit and equity.
The first case is the traditional one still favoured by some finance
ministers even in Western Europe. Central government borrows at the
official bond rate, with the borrowed money blending into the general
(otherwise tax-financed) central budget. As regards investment, this
treasury debt takes on the perceived quality of a grant, i.e.  costless
money, by the time the money arrives at its first destination, for instance
a municipality. This illusion is re-enforced by the time the money arrives
at the public utility. Outside scrutiny of the quality of the individual
investment does not take place, as capital markets need  to consider only
the creditworthiness of the central government. The economic discipline
imposed on the key technical decision-maker, the utility, is low, balanced
by other incentives (see below) which maximise the scale and cost of the
investment.
Moreover, under traditional budget funding, the investment is often
considered in isolation, as a stand-alone budget line not explicitly linked
to a “business plan” affecting annual budgets for another two decades. To
judge by the frequent references in the literature to oversized waste and
water treatment facilities, there appears to be some incentive to maximise
the investment rather than to  minimise the costs. The follow-on costs –
operational  and maintenance – are either not considered or, perversely,
maximised as they can increase the importance of the utility and hence its
claims on the budget and its weight in local employment.
Under the second option shown in Table 14, municipal borrowing, a key
decision-maker – local government – has a direct interest in cost-effective
solutions, as its total borrowing capacity is constrained. That same
government is heavily dependent on the technical advice of its utility,
however, which itself will also produce engineer-driven (or worse,
supplier-driven) solutions under this scenario rather than economic ones.
Moreover, the investment may still be judged as a once-off expenditure,
without due regard for the long-term burden on municipal budgets (or,
under cost-recovery pricing, on the local economy).38
Table 14. Debt finance for utilities
Finance
method
Borrower First
recipient
Guarantor Second recipient Perceived quality Lender scrutinises
Treasury
(bonds)
Central govt. Municipality Central govt. Municipal utility = Grant funding Nat’n debt; portfolio
*
Municipal
borrowing
Local authority Self Central govt./
Municipality
Municipal
utility
» Grant funding Municipal debt
Public
corporate
Utility Self [Municipality]
–
Debt Utility
Public project S.P. “vehicle” S.P. vehicle [Municipality] – Debt Project
PPP Shareholders Project
company
Shareholders
–
Debt Project
*The IMF assesses both the quality and the amount of total public debt; the EU’s test for adherence to the “Maastricht criteria” is chiefly
quantitative.
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This can change under the third option, i.e. when the public utility itself
assumes debt directly. The extent to which this changes the incentive
structure depends critically on the relationship between local government
and its utility. If the government itself effectively takes all decisions,
using the utility simply as a means of financial engineering, the outcome
is identical to option 2 (municipal borrowing). If, however, government
makes a transparent and virtually arms-length contract with the utility and
guarantees the loan only partially and conditionally, two economic agents
gain an interest in the efficiency of the investment decision.
The first is the utility itself, which now carries the loan on its balance
sheet and must service this debt for decades. The second, no less
important agent is the lender, i.e. the IFI and/or commercial bank, which
must now undertake due diligence scrutiny and assess the economic
viability of the investment.
However, the bank’s main concern will still be the creditworthiness of the
utility as a whole, not the individual investment. In other words, an
expensive unit can be added to an existing network which, by raising all
rates, effectively cross-subsidises the new plant. This is a common
procedure in this form of project finance.
This changes under the fourth option, where the debt is attached to a
specific investment through the use of a special project “vehicle”. To
obtain finance, promoters must not only present a “bankable” long-term
business plan, including full life-cycle costing, but also submit to
bankers’ scrutiny the legal soundness and quality of contracts linking the
project to the takers of its “off-take” contract. The interlinked nature of
financial (investment) and downstream revenue contracts also protects
the investment to some extent from undue political influence.
An example is a recent €81 million loan to finance the rehabilitation of
the Jakusevac landfill in Zagreb arranged by the EBRD and summarised
in the text box below.
The last option, public-private partnerships, can take many forms which
make the private sector a risk-sharing partner. This does not necessarily
mean private risk capital, but can involve a fixed-price turnkey contract,
management contract, etc.
Assuming classic project financing, private-sector suppliers will typically
provide equity together with the municipality. In theory, this creates an
incentive to design and deliver the most cost-effective solution. In
practice, as mentioned earlier, the (small, 10% of project cost) equity is
often “priced-into” the cost of supplies. This can create the worst of all
possible worlds, where the private sector gains the freedom implied in itsWOLFGANG HAGER
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equity (ownership) status while maximising returns as a supplier to “its”
company. Supplier credits may further weaken the discipline that might
be exercised by financial institutions in an arms-length relationship.
A case of non-recourse financing in Zagreb
The loan will be extended to ZGOS, a special purpose company that has
been established by the city of Zagreb for this project. The loan is guaranteed
by the city and consists of a €45 million A-Loan from the  EBRD’s account
and a €36 million B-loan syndicated to participating banks, led by  Dexia
Project and Public Finance International Bank ( Dexia). This is the first
international loan extended to the municipal sector in Croatia without a
sovereign guarantee.
The city of Zagreb's strong creditworthiness and the  EBRD’s preparatory
work, financial due diligence and involvement have been critical factors in
making the financing structure bankable.
Source: EBRD press release.
4.4  A public sector alternative to privatisation
Financing/management structures that allocate debt and hence
responsibility as closely as possible to the operational level while forcing
lenders to look further than the closure fee can help to break the
traditional nexus between public ownership and bureaucratic and
politicised management of utilities. Provided the institutional framework
is right, this creates options other than privatisation that require a level of
deontological probity and technical sophistication unlikely to be present
in all CEEC municipalities.
The solution with the least drawbacks appears to be the public limited
company borrowing and investing on its own responsibility. This
company concludes detailed performance and subsidy contracts with the
political owners (local government), like any private company. During
the past decade, this has become the standard model in most of Western
Europe. It is also the model favoured by the EU in cases where
privatisation is resisted, but where the option of competitive tendering for
municipal and regional utility services thus becomes available.
However, seemingly similar formal structures regulating relations
between city councils and “their” corporations had a variety of realities,
with considerable impact on the parameters that interests us most in this
context: efficiency and cost-savings.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
41
Governance is in fact crucial to success. City  councils must pass a
number of  self-denying ordinances, agreeing to:
-  a maximum of managerial autonomy for the undertaking. Reducing
competing technical and managerial structures in the administration
to a minimum is one indicator of good faith in this respect;
-  a board of management  that includes outside members who are
appointed for their knowledge and integrity, linked neither to the
political system nor to economic interests directly involved; and
-  an independent regulatory authority, i.e. foregoing the option of ex-
post political rate-setting.
The public corporation should have a private legal status and be subject
to standard accounting and reporting rules. A private minority stake can
be an advantage, if it a) protects the corporation from political
manipulation and b) brings in know-how. An equity stake by an IFI, such
as is available from the London-based EBRD, fulfils these criteria.
The advantages of this solution are:
-  cheap finance, as the risk premium is reduced through an explicit
guarantee or implicit backing of the main, public shareholder; and
-  a built-in limit either on neglecting broader social and environmental
concerns in the pursuit of profit or on  exerting  undue political
influence unconstrained by economic responsibility.
In order to deliver the maximum environmental effectiveness, however,
such a structure must operate under a number of broader economic
framework conditions. Only some of these are now becoming the object
of European policy, including:
-  cost-recovery pricing;
-  economically/environmentally efficient size; and
-  respect for the marginal cost (environmental utility) curve.
We now turn to these three elements of economic efficiency, each of
which requires making difficult political choices.42
CHAPTER 5
COST-RECOVERY PRICING
Utilities are the last refuge of the general practice in socialist economies
of setting political prices for goods and services of primary necessity.
Even in Western Europe, many utility rates were until recently subsidised
or cross-subsidised under the service of general interest ( service
publique) logic. This practice is now largely limited to public transport,
where an economically respectable case for such subsidies can be made
to capture socio-economic, so-called non-user, benefits.
21
(Higher) prices can make a crucial contribution to solving the problem
addressed in this study: how to pay for environmental investment. First,
higher prices reduce the wasteful consumption typical of the former
socialist countries, which not only benefits the environment but reduces
the quantity of investment needed to meet that reduced demand.
Secondly, and more obviously, they provide the financial resources to
fund investment. Less obviously, by lessening or entirely eliminating the
need for subsidies, they  also  provide the basis for the autonomy of
utilities and hence, again, for efficiency.
The positive effect of higher prices for both the environment and
investment is best documented for the energy sector. On average, the
CEECs’ economies consume five times as much energy per unit of GDP
as Western European economies. Even if the  CEECs doubled their
present GDP while at the same time achieving average Western European
efficiency levels, energy consumption would be 60% lower than  it is
today. In other words, closing or not upgrading 40% of existing capacity
could accommodate growth for the next 15 years, while allowing huge
savings in investment, current costs and  the balance of payments. In
addition to large local environmental benefits,  costless in cash terms,
there is the promise of greenhouse credits once the European and Kyoto
emissions trading schemes become fully operational .
22
Part of the computed efficiency gains from higher prices would be the
result not of reduced demand from final consumers, but from more
                                                                
21 Even here, however, the level of subsidies often reflects the considerable
inefficiencies deriving from the delivery of public services through public
agencies operating on a cost-plus basis. The latter are protected from political
scrutiny by providing politicians with well-paid supervisory board appointments.
22 See  Egenhofer and Mullins  (2000) and current research on this issue at
www.ceps.bePAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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efficient plant forced on electric utilities and other industrial users. For
the reasons explained in  the preceding chapter, even without any
additional regulatory constraints from the acquis,  that plant would not
only be more energy-efficient but also substantially cleaner per unit of
output.  Higher energy prices downstream would help to fund such
investment.
Similarly, the low price of water charged to households, industry and
agriculture leads to extraordinary waste. As a result,  status quo-based
planning for investment in treatment plants, sewerage systems, etc.
exaggerates the real needs. For both energy and water (and to a lesser
extent, waste), there is an important link between regulatory economic
reforms and the financial burden of acquis-related investment.
Across-the-board subsidies are blunt instruments to treat cases of
social hardship. Support targeted on the most needy households is
more efficient if decoupled from the pricing of services. Subsidies
can also be  useful to support project preparation for capital
investments, or public-partnerships. They should not discourage
energy and water conservation or public-private partnerships
(OECD, 1998).
The policy context for improved economic efficiency and investment in
the water sector has been improved by the adoption of the EU Water
Framework Directive in 2000. Its major innovation with regard to
economic efficiency is the imposition of basin-level planning on the one
hand (see section 4 of Chapter 6, below), and cost-recovery pricing on the
other. This Directive now forms part of the acquis. There has not been
enough time for these provisions to affect actual projects. The ability of
the Union to enforce this principle in the accession countries must be
seen against the performance of member  states in the present Union,
where recovery varies between 100% and  less than 1%, perversely in
some water-stressed regions in Southern Europe (see Speck, 2001).
5.1 Prices and consumption
There is a consensus in the economic profession that water has a low
price elasticity of demand, which contrasts with the evidence of recent
experience in the CEECs. The impact on consumption of higher pricing
introduced during the last decade in the transition countries has been
dramatic. These rises were introduced in response to budget constraints
and Western-inspired reforms that anticipated the acquis-mandated cost-
recovery principle.WOLFGANG HAGER
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In Bulgaria, for example, water consumption dropped to half and even
2/3 of previous levels,
23 although cost-recovery is limited to operational,
not capital, costs. In the Czech Republic, consumption of drinking water
dropped by 43%.
The EU Water Framework Directive, Article 9,1
Recovery of costs for water services
Member States shall take account of the principle of recovery of the costs of
water services, including environmental and resource costs, having regard to
the economic analysis conducted according to Annex III, and in accordance
in particular with the polluter pays principle.
Member States shall ensure by 2010:
-  that water pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users to use
water resources efficiently, and thereby contribute to the environmental
objectives of this Directive;
-  an adequate contribution of the different water uses,  disaggregated into
at least industry, households and agriculture, to the recovery of the costs
of water services, based on the economic analysis conducted according
to Annex III and taking account of the polluter pays principle.
Member States may in doing so have regard to the social, environmental and
economic effects of the recovery as well as the geographic and climatic
conditions of the region or regions affected.
To quote the World Bank on water investment in Poland:
Setting prices that reflect the cost of doing business.  This is
enormously important to investment planning because it affects
consumption. The investment costs [estimated] are calculated on
the basis of 1991 consumption levels in Poland. If we take
industrial and household consumption levels closer to the EU
average, the investment needs fall by 40-60% (emphasis added)
(World Bank, 1999c, p. 32).
What can explain the contradiction between elasticity pessimism and
observed reality? A closer look at the studies made to prove low price
elasticity shows that they have been mostly carried out in the US and
                                                                
23 See  Bardanska (2001, p. 39). Some of the measured decline is due to the
effective privatisation of local wells.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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Scandinavia.
24 The yield estimates of  elasticities as low as  -0.10 in
Scandinavia and -.03 in the US. Rich households spend insignificant
fractions of their income on water, not enough for marginal price changes
to affect consumer behaviour. As the graph below illustrates,  however,
higher prices have reduced consumption in Germany during the last
decade.  Industry in advanced countries, on the other hand, will have
already optimised consumption. Neither of these conditions applies to the
CEECs.
Figure 1. Daily personal water consumption
in Germany, per inhabitant
Source: Bundesverband der Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft (BGW).
It is by no means straightforward to translate the decline in consumption
to lower costs of services. In Estonia, prices have increased by between
three and almost ten-fold in the past five years leading to a “remarkable
decrease in water consumption”.
25 Paradoxically, in an otherwise
unchanged policy context, this can create further  upward pressure on
prices. An Estonian official makes the following revealing calculus: 80%
of water services are fixed costs, 20% variable. With fixed costs covered
by a reduced volume, unit prices would rise to  a level  where average
households would pay 4% and poor households 9% of income for water
                                                                
24 See Höglund (1999) and Dalhuisen (2001, p. 94).
25 See Kraav (2001, p. 43).
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services (at 100l/pp/day). Yet prices are still below cost-recovery levels
and only begin to reflect the cost of investment in EU-conform facilities.
While some of this calculus is explained by the exceptionally low level of
income in Estonia as compared to the world prices charged for upgrading
facilities, the basic flaw in the argument lies in taking the absolute
number behind the 80% fixed costs as given. Although no detailed data
are available, informal information suggests that the drop in water
consumption has not led to a reduction of staff in the industry; nor that
facilities that are now oversized have been scrapped.
5.2 Internalising external costs?
In the water sector, the principle of cost-recovery pricing is not entirely
straightforward. Environmentalists stress the (additional) environmental
cost of water use which needs to be internalised in prices. Thus, in
keeping with this intellectually sound view, the cost of water to the
consumer should reflect both the direct monetary cost of operations and
capital expenditure and also the internalised externalities. “For too long,
the environment has been subsidising the provision of water at below full
costs.”
26
While this may be a useful marker for sustainability policies in rich
countries, it is all but irrelevant in the context of poorer countries such as
the CEECs, where even the conventional cost-recovery level of prices
faces the social constraint (see section 5.3 below).
The EU Water Framework Directive of 2000 for the first time makes
cost-recovery prices mandatory (see text box above). However, it
includes “environmental and resource costs”. For the purpose of
encouraging investments in the  CEECs, this distracts from the more
realistic goal of reduced consumption and fails to identify the link
between pricing and investment resources. Moreover, allowing member
states to “have regard to the social…effects of [cost] recovery”
essentially allows the status quo to continue.
5.3  Prices: The social constraint
A key argument for low, non-cost recovery prices is social.
27 Prices for
utility-provided services are set at levels tailored to the ability of the
                                                                
26 See Tydeman (1994, p. 121).
27 A macroeconomic argument – inflation – is sometimes used to justify
resistance to change.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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poorest segments of society to pay. This is a serious matter in some of the
poorer CEECs: for at least a decade, successful transition will continue to
create a very unequal income distribution. The World Bank calculates a
rise in utility bills of households from the present 10% to 12% or 13% by
2015 in the Czech Republic
29 to reflect the cost of upgrading. This
appears modest, but implies a comparatively heavy price rise for low-
income sectors. (Absolute costs will, of course, more than double, but the
rise of GDP absorbs most of the relative cost increase in average
household income.)
The question is, however, whether maintaining an inefficient system
provides an optimum even from a narrowly social perspective. As is often
the case in municipal utilities, e.g. public transport in most EU countries,
generally inefficient management hides its underperformance behind the
social service provision. While that provision may justify a subsidy, this
can be targeted much more directly within a system that subjects
economic agents to quasi-market disciplines.
30
The poor tend to be more exposed to poor environmental conditions, and
are least able to afford medical care.
31 More generally, public
expenditures for environmentally related investments compete with other,
urgent social priorities, e.g. spending for health and education. Anything
that  reduces that burden, and thus frees resources for core public
responsibilities, is socially beneficial.
A related argument in favour of social pricing is “willingness to pay”. It
is generally stated that higher (cost-recovery) pricing is resisted by the
population as a whole and  is therefore politically impossible. One only
has to look at the UK with its resistance to fuel taxes and, until recently,
water metering, to recognise the force of this resistance.
Where consumer resistance is a major issue, temporary subsidies, on a
scale that does not nullify the incentive to save, may be supplied from the
public budget or by using soft-loans from Environment Funds and  IFIs.
Phasing-out schedules for such subsidies can be linked to the observed
growth of disposable income. In judging the “ bankability” of a water
                                                                
28 A macroeconomic argument – inflation – is sometimes used to justify
resistance to change.
29 World Bank (1999a, p. 182).
30 See also Estache et al. (2000).
31 The health benefits of environmental investments are being calculated by
ECOTEC for the Commission.WOLFGANG HAGER
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project, IFIs use an informal benchmark to the effect that subsequent user
charges should not exceed 4% of household income.
However, there needs to be a special solution for the very poor – a
significant part of the CEECs’ population. They must be in a position to
benefit from at least lifeline supplies of water, sanitation, electricity and
other services.
One way  that has been  advocated in the literature for combining
efficiency and equity goals is the so-called block tariff. Under an
increasing-block tariff, consumption of services (usually water or power)
is priced at an initially low rate up to a specified volume or use (block)
and at a higher rate per block thereafter. The number of blocks varies
from three to as many as ten.
32 This is the precise opposite of what is
practised by utilities operating under commercial considerations
unconstrained by regulation. Here, the rates decline with growing
volumes, reflecting economies of scale in service provision.
This  is  clearly a  case where environmental efficiency and social
acceptability conflict with crude measures of economic efficiency. It is in
situations like this where the growing official legitimacy of the
sustainability idea – which stresses the need to balance environmental,
social and economic efficiency – has to be made operational.
The trade-off is greatly facilitated, if the concept of economic efficiency
is enlarged from a pure business perspective to factoring social
acceptability/equity into the equation as a pre-condition for a generally
efficiency-enhancing system of pricing.
EU grants can lower the economic cost of investment to a level where
low-priced “lifeline” blocks can be charged to consumers. This avoids
charging all consumers at levels that are affordable by the poorest section
– with highly damaging results on total consumption as well as
investment funding.
As argued in greater detail in Chapter 6 , this effect can be nullified by
concentrating grants on a few projects. The maximum grant ratio
permitted by the Union’s pre-accession facility ISPA  – 75% of the total
– allows a few large investments to be made under conventional public
sector management and with heavily subsidised water rates, leaving no
grant money at all for subsequent projects. With a grant ratio of 15-20%,
a far larger number of investments would benefit without jeopardising the
economic discipline associated with corporate or project debt finance.
                                                                
32 See Bond (1998).PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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To the extent that user charges fall short of cost-recovery levels, subsidies
have to make up the difference. From an efficiency perspective, subsidies
are not neutral but conducive to mis-allocation of total public resources.
An OECD report (1998) on the subject concluded:
Subsidies have played an instrumental role in the development of
municipal environmental infrastructure in  CEECs…, often
representing more than three-quarters of capital outlays. While
subsidies reduce the revenue requirements that must be covered
from user chargers (thereby shifting the costs of services to a
broader range of taxpayers), they often engender perverse effects,
encouraging end-of-pipe investments at the expense of pollution
prevention and providing incentives for  oversizing of
infrastructure. They have also promoted overuse of energy and
water, thus exerting upward pressure on user fees once financial
support from central budgets was withdrawn or reduced.
5.4  Environmental funds
An EU (Phare, etc.) manual provides a succinct definition of a financing
mechanism with potential as a strategic development tool:
Extra-budgetary environmental funds are receiving growing
attention as mechanisms for providing, leveraging and facilitating
finance for environmental protection activities in CEE countries.
These funds are quasi-independent or independent institutions,
having been created by the initiative of Ministries of
Environment for the purposes of providing additional, ear-
marked finance for the support of environmental protection
activities (Francis, 1994).
Such funds exist, or are in the process of being formed, in nearly
every CEE country. (Exceptions include Romania and some of
the Balkan states.) In almost all of the countries where they
function, these funds are operated under the auspices of the
national Ministry of Environment. (The major exception is
Poland, which has a national and 49 provincial funds, existing as
legally independent institutions created by Parliamentary Act.)
The funds typically receive revenues from pollution charges and
fines, environmental taxes, product charges and other fees on the
use of natural resources and the environment. The funds then use
this money to support environmentally beneficial activities, such
as investments in pollution control and prevention technology,
environmental education, and the establishment of environmental
monitoring systems. The financial support provided by the fundsWOLFGANG HAGER
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is disbursed in various forms, most commonly as grants and soft
loans (European Commission, 1997, section 9.9).
Environmental Funds are an important source of finance for infrastructure
projects in most candidate countries. However, by raising prices (in the
form of para-fiscal eco-charges), they occupy the same “economic niche”
as full recovery pricing. The latter, although established only on
economic grounds, is in fact a much more powerful environmental policy
tool than the much lower pollution charges.
It was argued earlier that one of the beneficial effects of higher prices for
energy, water and waste is that they generate financial resources for new
investment. Several CEECs are indeed using the proceeds from fiscal and
para-fiscal charges paid by users and polluters to finance investments in
environmental infrastructure through environmental funds. These include
water effluent charges, waste disposal charges, air pollution charges,
fines, etc.
Environmental Development Fund of Slovenia
Established under the EP Act in 1993, the Environmental Development Fund
of Slovenia is a public legal entity organised as a non-profit joint stock
company, which provides preferential loans for environment projects.  The
Fund supports  public sector environmental services, the purchase and
development of equipment and technologies, aid to polluters in the
implementation of rehabilitation programmes, and financial engineering.
Since 1995,  EcoFund and the World Bank  have  cooperated on  an  Air
Pollution Abatement Programme, which provides soft loans  for household
and boilerhouse conversions from dirty fuels. Some  4,000 household loans
and 50 boilerhouse loans had been extended by 1998.
Total disbursement in 1995-97 totalled some DM 400 million; and the 1998
budget was also DM 400 million.
Such mechanisms are claimed to have two advantages. Politically, they
appear to create an equitable link between taxation and its use, easing
public acceptance and/or making it difficult for industrial lobbies to
object to such charges as machinations of finance ministers. Secondly,
“ring-fencing” such revenue for the purpose of investment is thought to
provide a stable basis for long-term investment that is reasonably secure
from rival claims on the public budget and from annual budgetary
politics.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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The main objection to such schemes must be that they may only
marginally improve the status quo, supporting rather than calling into
question a system of political pricing and public administration. Charges,
for instance, are set well below cost-recovery prices. Investments
continue to be planned, executed and operated by municipal or other
public agencies.
There have already been occasions, however, when the EBRD, for
instance, has been able to associate “soft” money from Environmental
Funds with debt finance to yield socially acceptable user charges without
compromising the institutional efficiency of investments.52
CHAPTER 6
POLICY ISSUES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
6.1 The scope for policy
This study has sought to demonstrate that when environmental
investment costs are properly counted – including operating and
financing costs – and compared to sustainable GDP shares, they can only
be undertaken in decades with transition periods to match.
At this level of analysis there is no significant margin of choice for the
candidate countries that could be influenced through tough negotiating
demands from the European Union. This would seem to put the onus of
providing the physical pre-conditions for rapid acquis compliance firmly
back on the EU itself. Only substantially enlarged grants from the EU
could bridge the gap between EU-mandated investments and EU and
western-mandated fiscal probity.
The next step in our analysis was to look more closely at the assumptions
underlying the current cost estimates and to identify potential sources of
savings. In the context of this small exploratory study, it was of course
not possible to quantify the combined effects of “automatic” economic
adjustment and a better policy mix. In each case, however,  the study
identified orders of magnitude that were considerable. Between 30% and
50% seemed possible in many areas. While it may be unrealistic to
assume that each of these savings is fully achievable, these are in fact
compound savings (unit costs, unit numbers, unit size, marginal cost
principle –  see section  6.2 below –  and operating efficiency), so that
partial success with each would still result in, say, halving compliance
costs.
These numbers serve no predictive purpose. They do, however, suggest
that there are significant potential gains from optimising policy. Taking
the simplest evidence: the range of unit costs from simple to triple and
more contained in the original 1997 study suggests that there is a high
potential pay-off from institutional arrangements that impose economic
efficiency and guarantee independence from supplier interests. Unit costs
are only the beginning, however. Other mechanisms – e.g. cost-recovery
user charges – can significantly reduce the physical capacity needed.
Institutional arrangements, discussed later in this chapter, can promote or
prevent the investment in plants of efficient size, with savings of up to
50% in life-cycle costs. This suggests that policy should not be limited to
finding money for “planned” investment (which, in the case of supplierPAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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finance, can be counterproductive) but  rather  be directly targeted at
getting value for money.
Equally important, even that reduced expenditure can often be taken off
current public budget and/or national debt. We must not confuse the two
different macroeconomic constraints facing the candidate countries in this
context: the budgetary/debt limits set by fiscal prudence, as dictated by
the IMF and “Maastricht” on the one hand; and, on the other, the total
“burden” on the economy created by the need to divert productive
investment and consumption to fulfilling the environmental acquis. It is a
reflection of traditional thinking (and the importance of “public” utilities
in the total picture) that these two magnitudes are often treated as one.
The “burden” on the economy argument is, of course, highly questionable
economics,
33 although in the present Union, it is increasingly part of
industry’s (and even the Commission’s) mantra, warning not to damage
competitiveness.
Making the efficiency of investment decisions and subsequent operations
a key target of policy fits badly with current practice, which leaves the
task of project preparation to the candidate countries, reducing the
Union’s role to approval or refusal on largely formal, procedural grounds.
This last concluding chapter argues for a more economically focused
approach, which uses the present instruments of pre-accession aid and
dialogue more intelligently.
6.2 Marginal costs vs. full compliance
One of the most widely documented relationships in environmental
economics is the exponentially declining rate of environmental return on
investment (see Figure 1). Two examples show the practical importance
of this relationship to CEEC compliance efforts and its potential for an
environmentally efficient transition strategy.
One example taken from wastewater treatment plotted schematically in
the graph below, shows the exponential cost of removing the last 30% or
10% of a contaminant as compared to the first 70% or 90%, etc.
                                                                
33 See, for instance, Section 2.3.6 on health benefits. More broadly, leaving aside
narrow issues of cost competitiveness for individual businesses, discussed in
Section  3.2, investing in the environment and “consuming” environmental
benefits through higher prices does not lower GDP, but merely changes its
composition. See also Heymann and Walter (2002).WOLFGANG HAGER
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In detail, the numbers – in this case for wastewater treatment in the
CEECs – may look as presented in Table 15.
Figure 2. Marginal cost curve of waste water treatment ($/kg)
Primary treatment     Bio & chem.w/denitration
Table 15. Marginal costs of waste water treatment ($/kg, BOD removal)
Treatment level Total
cost
Marginal
cost
Primary 0.55
Chem. enhanced primary 0.59 0.04
Primary precipitation 0.73 0.14
With biological treatment 1.00 0.27
Biological and chemical 1.00 0.0
Bio & chemical with denitration 1.45 0.45
Source: Somlyody (1995).
The second example relates to compliance costs for the Urban Waste
Water Directive (UWWD) in the Czech Republic. Here the marginal cost
curve is generated by technical economies and diseconomies of scale
related to the size of conurbations to be connected to sewerage pipelines
and advanced treatment facilities.
At present, a comparatively high percentage – 74% – of the population is
connected to the public sewerage system (although 10% of this receives
no treatment). There are 650 communities with a population above 2000
– the level specified in the Directive – which need to invest in sewage
0.6
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networks. Some of these communities are close to major conurbations
and can be connected cheaply. Others are dispersed and would need
small, relatively costly installations.
Table 16. Czech investment in sewerage to comply with the UWWP for
   towns with populations between 2,000 and 10,000
% of community covered Investment (€ million)
0
1 726
60 1000
100 1775
1 Cost of improving the larger conurbation’s only.
Source: World Bank.
A ventilation by percent of the population served would show a dramatic
rise of costs at the margin, since the last 40% are the smallest
communities. The World Bank argues that compliance costs could be
halved by exempting from the Directive the smaller communities situated
in areas where well managed septic tanks are an environmentally sound
alternative. There is a second reason to delay investing in small rural
communities: many of these communities will shrink, especially in
Poland, as a result of CAP-induced rationalisation. Moreover, limited
public funds will be needed to finance infrastructure for the new urban
populations which will be displaced from the land.
The issue of marginal benefits with respect to costs is the subject of a
largely underground debate between DG Environment and the major IFIs
(EIB, World Bank and the EBRD, but also the Commission’s own ISPA).
It should be brought out in the open and decided by the political masters
of these institutions.
DG Environment generally insists that all new plant, e.g. a wastewater
treatment facility, should satisfy the highest standard immediately. The
IFIs would argue that building a plant achieving a reduction of 80% of
pollutants at 50% of the cost of a 100% performance would allow
building another plant coping with 80%. Thus, with a given amount of
investment, 160 rather than 100 units of damage to the environment are
avoided.
The Commission is concerned with the credibility of the letter of the law
– a credibility that extends beyond the  CEECs. Although double
standards exist de facto in the execution of environmental legislation in
the EU, the law as such is not called into question. Thus, by insisting onWOLFGANG HAGER
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full compliance, the Commission keeps its powder dry, i.e. the ability to
take a member state to Court if persuasion fails.
The goal of maintaining the integrity of the law in an enlarged Union is
thus not a trivial one. Current policy does not, however, squarely face the
fact that a Union of double-standards is a mathematical inevitability. The
real question therefore is whether these double standards should exist on
paper (a simple policy guidance) or in the environment. It is clear that
those with a proprietary stake in the regulations they have fought years to
put on the books give priority to avoiding the compliance gap on paper.
Neither finance ministers nor environmental politicians need share this
view.
The dilemma may be resolved by combining three approaches. The first
would be to tighten the deadline for carrying out priority investments on a
range of cost-effective investments. The World Bank could produce a list
of such investments in a matter of months – to be discussed with the
candidates. The second element would be to gain a commitment from the
candidates to spend a specified and disproportional (in EU terms) share of
the budget until such time as full compliance is achieved. The transition
period is indefinite, which merely acknowledges reality, but the
dynamism of compliance would be arguably higher than in some current
(Cohesion) member states.
The third approach would be to use the PEPA process,
34 in combination
with the “funded investment strategy” required prior to accession, to
obtain a realistic picture of the time frame involved in achieving full
compliance. Such a picture should differentiate between delays due to
funding constraints and those due to technical delays. The purpose of this
exercise would not be to fix transition periods, but to allow a political
judgement on the seriousness of the compliance gap on the one hand, and
to show policy options, including the size and allocation from future
Regional Fund allocations, on the other.
                                                                
34 As mentioned in the Introduction, the Commission launched in 2000 a
technical assistance initiative, PEPA (Priority Environmental Projects for
Accession), to look into the reasons for the low rate of project proposals and to
help the candidates acquire a detailed and accurate view of their own acquis-
related project preparation
(see http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/docum/pepaprogramme2001.pdf ).PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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6.3 Leveraging grants for maximum policy impact
Grants from the Union are a welcome supplement to other forms of
funding and finance. Properly allocated, they can provide a “soft”
element to the total package, whose benefits can be passed on, for
example, to provide concessionary rates to disadvantaged groups in new
cost-recovery pricing schemes for utilities.
However, if grants are badly used, they can do as much damage as they
do good. The largest single flaw of the present ISPA regulation is to
allow 75% (exceptionally 85%) of total capital costs to be funded by an
EU grant, the rate currently used for “Cohesion” funding for the four
“poorest” member states. It is the European Parliament that has insisted
on this misguided form of generosity.
There is a long experience with both the Regional and Cohesion Funds
showing that what one might call “easy money” is not spent well. In the
case of utilities, the lucky recipient (municipality) has little incentive to
choose cost-effective technology, and to make choices of scale and
location which take into account the needs of its neighbours (see section
6.4 above) There is also a tendency to disregard follow-on operational
costs. In the rush to get a share of limited funds, older but well specified
project proposals are dusted off and presented, although changed
circumstances may dictate a different approach altogether. Grant finance
on this scale thus also cements the existing public utility structures. Little
or no innovation is required in management and price regimes. Outside
scrutiny over the economic rationale of the investment is kept to a
minimum.
These drawbacks are not trivial but concern the entire water and waste
sectors, which account for half of the calculated compliance costs for
“investment-heavy” directives. The ideal would be a cap on EU grants at
a maximum of 20% of investment costs. This would also fit more closely
with Commission r hetoric to be found both in Regional Policy and
accession documents, which make mixed financing the option of choice.
With a smaller, e.g. 10-20%, grant share, far more projects can be
reached than is the case under the 75% rule. The distorting effects of easy
money would be all but eliminated by the discipline imposed on both
government and utility managers by the remaining 80-90% to be found
from their own resources. While too small an amount to reduce efficiency
incentives, grants in this range would be enough of a carrot to exercise
conditionality if a policy framework existed. One such  conditionality
would be to ensure that the most effective scale choice possible is being
made – which usually means that more than one municipality is involved.WOLFGANG HAGER
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Table 17. ISPA grants as share of project costs
Project Cost
€ Mil.
ISPA
share
LITHUANIA
Vilnius: rehab. & extension of water supply 40.00 50%
Druskinninkai: Wastewater treatment 5.50 50%
POLAND
Torun: Water modernisation 79.10 62%
Krakow: Wastewater treatment plant 80.00 60%
Szczecin: Sewage disposal 46.40 66%
Wroclaw: Collectors/waters supply 65.25 56%
Gdynia: Wastewater plant for community Union 20.85 72%
Krakow: Municipal waste managem. in municipality 22.75 62%
Wroclaw: Solid waste 20.40 66%
ESTONIA
Tartu: Tunnel collector project K2 7.70 71%
Narva: City sewerage treatment plant rehab. 8.95 56%
BULGARIA
Regional landfills (group) waste management 60.60 75%
Stara Zagora Dimitrovgrad: Construction 43.40 75%
HUNGARY
Szeged: Wastewater collection & treatment plant 66.65 50%
Szeged: Regional waste management program 12.80 65%
Szolnok: Waste management system 10.30 70%
LATVIA
Riga: Water & Environment project phase II 24.30 70%
Jelgava: Development of water supply, wastewater 15.00 75%
Venspills: Improvement of water supply, wastewater 20.10 47%
ROMANIA
Craiova: Rehab. of sewerage network 70.40 75%
Lasi: Upgrading of water & wastewater system 51.40 75%
Valea Jiuliu: Dunutuni wastewater treatment plant 9.70 75%
CZECH REPUBLIC
Ostrava: City sewage system upgrading 24.90 67%
SLOVENIA
Celje: Wastewater treatment plant 14.75 60%
Lendava: Sewerage system & central wastewater 11.65 44%
SLOVAKIA
Trencin: Sewerage & wastewater & water treatment plant 7.95 50%
Nitra: Wastewater treatment; Plant sewerage system 10.35 50%
TOTAL 829.45 66%
Source: Calculated from ISPA press release, 27 October 2000.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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Annual ISPA funding available for the environment is about €500
million. Against the estimated bill of €100 billion, plus operating costs,
this money must be seen more as a potential policy lever for efficiency
than a significant contribution to a funding gap.
The ISPA grant share in recent environmental projects in the CEECs is
shown in Table 13.
This high share of European grant aid – an average of 66% of project cost
and with many projects benefiting from the full 75% ceiling – seems to
be in conflict with several of the “key orientations” established for ISPA
by the Commission, notably the last point:
-  Community dimension of investments,
-  systemic approaches (no isolated ad hoc interventions),
-  concentration on projects with impact on a maximum number of
people, and
-  maximum financial leverage.
Direct bureaucrat-to-bureaucrat deals are easier and faster to arrange than
financial engineering, which normally requires considerable technical and
institutional adjustments to project proposals as well as lengthy
negotiations. Initially, there would have been few projects to fund if
ISPA had tried to introduce “financial leverage”.
In cases where privatisation is not the answer (see  Section  4.1) the
solution must therefore be to encourage the establishment of public or
semi-public entities that are large and sophisticated enough to put
together project proposals and financing packages in which EU grants,
domestic grants, soft loans from Environment Funds and  IFIs and
supplier credits can be combined. This raises the larger problem of
municipal utilities as the single most important agent in  acquis
investment.
6.4 The problem of municipalities
The fact that municipalities are often the ultimate economic agents in
charge of the bulk of “heavy” accession investments poses a number of
problems.
Municipalities (in most of Europe) tend to be not only the owners of
water, waste and energy utilities but also the economic regulators (price
setters), albeit within the framework of national legislation. Thus, they
tend to own the infrastructure assets and frequently also directly provide
the services. Local employment and local patronage are involved. At theWOLFGANG HAGER
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same time, they have limited means to engage in new investment with
their own resources. In most CEECs, their borrowing capacity is capped
at 10-15% of annual expenditure. They thus have power (as project
promoters and owners) without responsibility (for the economic cost and
efficiency of investment choices).
Apart from the general problems associated with bureaucrats as economic
agents, a particular problem arises in environmental infrastructures for
water, wastewater and solid waste management. Here, frequently, the
cheapest and most efficient solution requires cooperation between several
municipalities.
In part this reflects scale economies. As regards water and waste
management, the geographical area governed by a given municipality
may be a) too small to support technically efficient plant and b) not
coincide with the geography of the ecological space to be managed,
notably the (river) basin. It is only at this level that solutions with the
lowest costs (cost/environmental benefit ratios) can be identified.
Planning at this level is now becoming mandatory under the EU Water
Framework Directive adopted in 2000. Article 9.2 reads: “Member States
shall report in the River Basin Management Plans on the planned steps
towards implementing paragraph 1 which will contribute to achieving the
environmental objectives of this Directive and on the contribution made
by the various water uses to the recovery of the costs of water services”.
But this Directive sets 2009 as the deadline for adopting such plans –
much too late to serve as a guide for crucial investments to be undertaken
during this decade. Moreover, for the purposes of identifying ecologically
meaningful cooperation projects between municipalities, a river basin is
often too large a unit. The US equivalent, watersheds, are smaller in
scale. (Watersheds also often define real communities, with all this means
in terms of mobilising civil society and collective responsibility.)
Such planning, however, can be a mere technical exercise far removed
from the political decisions on the ground. It is therefore doubly
important – from an economic as well as environmental efficiency point
of view – to create structures that induce municipalities to cooperate in a
wider framework.
In theory, central government has the means to encourage such
cooperation through making it a condition for ministerial grants and soft
loans from Environment Funds. As stated elsewhere, however, direct
grants from e.g. ISPA or soft loans from Western technology suppliers
may undermine such discipline which, at any rate, is weakened by party-
political and other links or rivalries at local and central government level.PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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Municipal governments are also loathe to lose political patronage which
would follow any serious rationalisation.
In Hungary, for instance, the 1990 Self-Government Act transferred the
assets of 28 water service companies to the larger municipalities. These
companies have, however, been broken up into 300 new service
companies. These are too small to either make cost-effective investments
or manage operations at the requisite technical level.
35
What is the solution? Outright privatisation has proven less than
successful in the CEEC water sector, and private concessions granted
under present conditions could well perpetuate the municipal
fragmentation. On the other hand, traditional public agency-type
management does not provide a suitable framework for efficient
economic management and investment.
Experience in countries such as the Netherlands, however, shows that
public companies can work efficiently in the water sector. There are two
requisite conditions, which are mutually supportive. The first is a sharing
of ownership and concession rights in an “intercommunal”-type structure.
This dilutes party-political interference, making it easier to take rational
decisions on staffing levels, location of plants, etc. The second condition
for efficiency is to give the jointly owned water company responsibility
for its balance sheet, including, crucially, the right to raise debt in its own
name. The legal form of such a company should be that of a private
limited company.
France is also a leader in creating “ intercommunal” associations for
infrastructure purposes, while Germany (which is the country of origin of
many consultants sent to the CEECs) has the most inefficient system of
water management in Europe, owing to its fragmentation. According to
the World Bank, cost savings of 50% would be possible through a more
rational system in Germany.
36
6.5 Financial and environmental benefits of an integrated
energy strategy
There exists what one might call a mechanistic view of acquis investment
which suits civil servants, private project promoters and IFIs alike. It is
the result of looking at investment requirements from an essentially status
quo perspective, without considering broader options. The Bulgarian
                                                                
35 World Bank (1999d, p. 180).
36 Kraemer and Jagen (1995).WOLFGANG HAGER
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energy efficiency programme of 1999 shows, on paper at least, that an
integrated strategy that reduces demand as well as improves the quality of
supply is an attractive proposition on financial grounds and well as
regarding pollution control. Using purchasing power parity as a base,
Bulgaria’s energy consumption per unit of GDP is seven times (!) the
OECD average.
37
The programme contains 1) measures requiring no investment (price
reform); 2) low-cost investment, e.g. in efficient street lighting; and 3)
heavy investment in e.g. household  gasification, the reduction of
transmission losses in electricity and improved co-generation.
The table below summarises the economic and environmental costs and
benefits of implementing the programme. The most striking numbers are
those of columns 2 and 3. It shows a payback period for investments
ranging from one year (households), two years for industry and street
lighting and four years for the costly energy sector itself.
In addition, the energy savings would avoid building two new 2.3 MW
power stations at a cost of  $3 billion – not counting the follow-on annual
operating costs. These savings correspond to 1.3 times the total
investment cost of the energy efficiency programme itself.
It is a comment on governance – in Bulgaria, the Commission and the
IFIs – that such an economic bargain is taken up only hesitantly. There
are four major obstacles. One is shortage of public money for investments
or investment guarantees. The second is the fragmentation of national
responsibilities, notably between different ministries, between central
government and municipalities and the national producer monopolies.
The National Efficiency Agency has no powers: it is an official lobby
within government.
The third obstacle is the absence of a self-interested project promoter.
Apart from the public interest (and, potentially) the minister of finance,
virtually all economic and public agents lose from such a programme. By
contrast, merely adding capacity is good business, while 100 micro-
investments, in e.g. improved co-generation or street lighting, do not
form a critical mass. Commissioning large projects is satisfying, bringing
power and money to top central and municipal officials. IFIs, although on
paper are committed to supporting programmes of this kind, tend to
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behave much like banks on the ground.
38 They prefer projects with real
cash flow over gains from reduced oil imports or reduced public
expenditure which are difficult to “engineer” into a financing package.
The much maligned World Bank, which generally does excellent public
policy work in the CEECs, is an honourable if partial exception. Three
years (!) after the establishment of the Bulgarian National Efficiency
Agency, it produced a study
39 calling for a National Efficiency Strategy.
In contrast to the purely technical study cited earlier as the source of
Table 18, the World Bank report had to be carried out in collaboration
with the authorities, notably the powerful State Agency for Energy and
Energy Resources (SAEER)
That agency exhibits a traditional producer mentality, sharing,  i.a., the
fascination of most Balkan countries with exports and thus the apparent
need to create new capacity.
40 The Bank’s report thus had to include a
high export scenario requiring investment in new capacity by 2015 of
2,246 MW, as opposed to 750 MW under a no-export scenario. It also
had to include a scenario assuming high international gas prices which
would make it economical to construct three lignite-powered 300 MW
plants.
While the World Bank’s policy recommendations partially overlap with
the priorities of the AEVA study cited earlier – notably the need for cost-
recovery prices for electricity, improved co-generation and investment in
a residential gas network to tap into the Russian transit pipeline, it does
not contain an explicit reference to the small, high-payback schemes cited
in the AEVA study.
The fourth obstacle for implementing a programme of this kind is created
by the approach of the European Commission. There are, in fact, two
elements. First, given the severe shortage of staff (contrary to myth),
which lowers the  quality of  the Commission’s work  in all  policy areas,
                                                                
38 In the words of one analyst, “The requirements of the [IFIs] are generally so
strict, both formally and financially, that very few environmental projects have
been able to qualify for loans – and it has been argued that these projects might
well have been financed by any commercial banker” (Andersen, 1999).
39 Ibid.
40 Exports are superficially attractive as a source of foreign exchange, a calculus
that ignores the foreign exchange cost of building new capacity with high risk-
premium capital. In Bulgaria, the argument is complicated by the political
conflict with the EU over the requested closure of four out of six nuclear power
plants.64
Table 18. The Bulgarian Energy Efficiency Programme
Greenhouse gas reduction
Sector Investment
($)
Annual
savings
($)
Gen.
capacity
saved MW
Electricity
savings
(mil.
kw/h)
Energy
savings
(Ktoe/y)
CO2
(Kt/y)
N2O
(t/y)
CH 4
(t/y)
SO2
reduction
(Kt/y)
Industry 701 325 390 1960 1775 7743 1089 280 55
Households
and services
540 542 134 670 1248 1124 25 276 87
Transport 245 50 0 – 147 480 4 73 4
Efficient
lighting
215 94 921 1566 130 2630 820 33 19
Energy
sector
652 146 900 1250 1130 317 7 5 75
TOTAL 2353 1157 2345 2816 4430 12294 1945 667 240
Source: National Efficiency Agency, Bulgaria/Austrian Energieverwertungsagentur (unpublished, 1999).PAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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there is the technical/administrative preference for large rather than may
small projects. Occasionally, EU grants are attached to World Bank
programme lending, but nothing as varied and long-term as the Bulgarian
strategy can be put into the format (financial precision, tendering, etc.)
required for grant aid. Secondly, and equally fundamentally, the EU’s
policy, managed by DG1A (now Enlargement DG), has exclusively
concentrated on its mandate of assuring  acquis compliance. It largely
ignored the “Environment for Europe” process, which was initiated in
Dobris in 1991 and was concerned with environmental rather than legal
priorities.
42
6.6 The EU Commission’s capacity for strategic action
These comments raise the question of the Commission’s ability to deliver
policy optimisation. Enlargement is a hugely complex task. Even from a
purely “ acquis” perspective, there were 30-odd policy “chapters” to
negotiate with each of the ten-plus candidate countries. Compared to
earlier enlargement negotiations, “Copenhagen”
45 broke new ground as
regards political “criteria” but not as regards the core economic agenda.
In other words, as regards democracy, the rule of law, etc., there is a
recognition of the special conditions presented by “transformation”. On
the economic front, the problem of transformation is largely subsumed in
the adoption, by the candidate countries, of a particular system of market
regulation (adapted in the case of the CAP). There is, of course, active
support for this adoption in the form of assistance to “administrative
capacity-building” and other forms of technical assistance.
Nevertheless, it still seems odd that nowhere in the Commission is there a
locus of reflection and  coordination dealing with the unique economic
development/transformation process in substantive rather than purely
institutional terms. The candidate countries are presented with a thousand
hurdles to jump and given some aid, but the Commission’s role is
essentially one of monitoring progress. That monitoring is carried out
                                                                
42 See Andersen (1999, p. 2).
43 Exports are superficially attractive as a source of foreign exchange, a calculus
that ignores the foreign exchange cost of building new capacity with high risk-
premium capital. In Bulgaria, the argument is complicated by the political
conflict with the EU over the requested closure of four out of six nuclear power
plants.
44 See Andersen (1999, p. 2).
45 The basic political roadmap for enlargement was agreed at the 1993 European
Council in Copenhagen.WOLFGANG HAGER
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“chapter” by chapter by the relevant DGs without strategic coordination
of the effects of related policies.
This is obvious in the case of the environmental acquis. This study has
suggested that there are many levers of policy that together could perhaps
halve the burden of  acquis compliance and/or halve the time for
achieving it. On either environmental or economic development grounds,
this is a big prize. The savings potential is equivalent to the total of
accession aid to the year 2006. In light of the prospect of enlarging the
euro area and maintaining stability afterwards, ± 1% of GDP more or less
on the current budget deficit is a large number.
But the procedures governing the interactions between the Commission
and the candidate countries are designed to prevent policy optimisation.
The first flaw is the early fragmentation of EU administrative
responsibility in DG Enlargement into departments dealing with
individual countries. This makes sense if the process to be administered is
exclusively seen in terms of negotiation, and thus, ultimately, in legal
terms. But administrative units dealing with single countries cannot each
have the necessary in-depth knowledge of the actual economic sectors
they are de facto influencing. This part of the equation is supposed to be
supplied by the specialised DGs, in our case DG Environment.
But this does not necessarily solve the problem. First, the general terms
of reference even for DG Environment are ultimately legal, even when
this includes institutional and investment components. In other words,
DG Environment is not asked to assist in improving the environment in
the candidate countries and to develop a strategy for achieving this at the
lowest cost. Even if this were its mandate, it would not necessarily have
the expertise:  DG  Environment is mainly a regulator, staffed by
generalists and lawyers assisted by scientists.
And  if DG  Environment had a broader mandate for
accession/transformation policies, it would not be in a position to
coordinate these policies with other relevant departments: DG Economic
and Financial Affairs (which should be)  concerned with the
budgetary/Maastricht implications of the acquis investment programme;
DGs Energy and Internal Market, which deal with the liberalisation of
energy markets and public utilities in general;  and  DG Competition,
which must take a view on subsidies, etc. Coordination is firmly in the
hands of DG Enlargement which, to repeat, is in the business of
managing a negotiating process, not concrete policy.
As argued  elsewhere in this chapter, a crucial potential player in the
Commission is DG Regional Policy and more particularly its specialisedPAYING FOR THE GREEN ACQUIS
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Directory F: ISPA (see above). More than any  other single  agency, it
could be the executor of a comprehensive, ecologically and economically
intelligent investment strategy. However, with a mandate narrowed to
(financing infrastructure for) acquis compliance and with a limited staff,
it is largely preoccupied with processing project proposals.
This limited role is also  necessarily the result of another basic decision
taken by the Union: to leave the initiative for project proposals to the
candidate countries, with the Commission’s role limited to that of
granting or denying approval. Much of that process is concerned with the
observance of proper procedures. Economic considerations tend to be
limited to assuring financial cover for investments, and not their intrinsic
cost-effectiveness. DG Environment is asked to comment on larger
projects, but lacks resources (manpower and expertise) and  the mandate
to judge the economic merits of the projects in question.
To the extent that there is a locus of strategic transformation intelligence
in the EU system, this resides, somewhat tenuously, in the partnership
agreement with the World Bank. The World Bank’s usefulness is, above
all, as a consultant. It has two clients: the EU Commission and the
candidate countries. Through  Phare, the EU pays for some consultancy
services to the candidate countries. These serve to co-fund
comprehensive transformation strategies in such sectors as education,
health, poverty reduction and, in our case, the environment. When it
comes to implementing such strategies  though investment, the World
Bank can provide programme loans, again supplemented by  Phare, etc.
grants. These loans, however, are more likely to finance the
administrative infrastructure for reforms rather than big-ticket items.
Here, the Bank reverts to its core role as lender. For countries with low
incomes, World Bank loans are cheaper than public funding by the
national treasuries through the bond markets. This is no longer true for
the more developed candidate countries (Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). The latter two have recently accessed the
bond market at respectively 27 and 30 basis points above Libor – a rate
that the World Bank cannot match.
46
This may seem surprising, given that the Bank can borrow very cheaply
on world capital markets. The explanation lies in what the Bank itself
calls “high transaction costs”. Translated, this means that  Bank loans
                                                                
46 “Framework for World Bank Group Support to EU Accession Candidate
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe”, (revised) January 2002
(http://www.worldbank.org/eca/euenlargement/).WOLFGANG HAGER
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come with a package of value-added expertise which, from an outsider’s
perspective, improve resource allocation by much more than the cost of a
few hundred basis points on loans. For borrowing governments, however,
the real cost, may lie in the loss of political room for manoeuvre that is
implied in the Bank’s insistence on project quality. Unlike the practice of
other banks, notably the EIB, that quality is not judged on a stand-alone
basis but in the context of a programmatic sector analysis.
It is here that the Commission and more particularly ISPA could redress
the balance by aligning its grant allocation with the judgement of the
World Bank – literally the only source of strategic economic thinking
available. This happens on an ad hoc basis at the national level, but the
large percentage grants of ISPA help to “crowd out” the sort of economic
discipline that the Bank brings to the table.
The EIB, in theory the natural partner of the Commission and with far
larger resources for lending in the CEECs, has a philosophy of respecting
the sovereign preferences of its borrowers, which helps to keep its staff
small and profits high on the back of solid sovereign guarantees. While
committed to supporting the EU’s political objectives, it stresses its
Treaty-accorded right to interpret this commitment independently of the
Commission.
In sum, while sources of economic intelligence and the instruments for
applying such intelligence exist, the Union’s governance of the
enlargement process is fragmented and lacks an administrative/political
focus for any strategy going beyond formal acquis compliance. The costs
to the candidate countries, the future stability of the euro, the Union’s
own budget and last, but by no means least, to the environment are
significant.69
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